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This paper was presented to the Conference ‘Human 
Rights and the European Community: towards 1992 and Beyond’ 
held at the European Parliament in Strasbourg 20-21 November 
1989. It represents the final synthesis report of a project 
directed by Professor A. Cassese. The project drew together a 
number of experts who wrote reports on various aspects of 
‘Human Rights and the European Community’. The present 
paper draws on these reports and all references are to the 
individual reports, which are listed in the annex to this paper 
together with details on how to obtain them.
A complete collection of all the reports together with key 
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I. Why Do we Need an Action Plan?
‘Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats -  Nous unissons des hommes’
These inspiring words of Jean Monnet assume a new and urgent 
meaning as the Community takes its greatest step since its 
establishment to realize the aspirations of European integration, 
and moves further along the road to an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe. Jean Monnet’s words are evoked here as 
a reminder of the essential position of the individual in the 
European Community, and of the need, precisely at this stage of 
exciting and great change, to reassess and reassert the 
importance of the individual -  of the men and women who 
ultimately make up Europe. These words underline the need in 
current policy formation for a prudent yet determined 
Community Human Rights Action Plan.
Such a plan would not only yield concrete and essential 
protection and individual benefits; it would also give a little soul 
to the wide range of Community activities in the economic and 
social spheres. It will be a reminder of the Community’s 
commitment to the ultimate beneficiaries of European 
integration -  Community citizens.
A. Anxiety over the implications of 1992 
could be met with effective rights protection
The 1992 programme (laid down in the Single European Act of 
1987 which has among other objectives the completion of the 
Internal Market before 1st January 1993) has received 
widespread endorsement not only from Governments of 
Member States but also from the general public. On the whole 
the programme has been met with real popular enthusiasm. 
But, at the same time, enthusiasm and expectation have been 
mingled with anxiety and even fear. In part, this is fear of the 
unknown, and anxiety over the need to reconstitute oneself as 
part of a huge new European polity. Inevitably the increased 
economic freedoms of the large Internal Market lead each 
individual to feel smaller and fear the impact on his or her daily 




























































































be accompanied by apprehension about one’s own individual 
personal space and autonomy.
The Community cannot and should not shut its eyes to 
these understandable anxieties. Such a failure could undermine 
public support and lead to retrograde nationalist reactions long 
since forgotten. An answer must come from within the 
Community and its institutions. And part of this answer could 
take the shape of a concrete and visible Human Rights Action 
Plan tailored to the specificities of the current stage of European 
evolution. Although any action plan would have to respect the 
continuing and essential role played by the Member States on 
the one hand, and regional and universal organizations on the 
other, such an action plan could nonetheless reassure the 
citizens and residents of Europe that along with enhanced 
economic and geographical freedoms, there will also follow 
enhanced individual liberty.
B. Human Rights in the EC are a check on 
Community competence rather than an extension
It is sometimes suggested that for the Community to actively 
engage in the field of human rights would represent an 
encroachment on the prerogatives and competences of the 
Member States. This is a misconception. To be sure, in all its 
activities the Community must respect the principle of 
subsidiarity. But the call for a Human Rights Action Plan, limited 
of course to the field of application of Community law, derives 
from this principle. By their own actions, the Member States 
have fully participated over the last two decades in a massive 
expansion in Community competences -  culminating in the 
issue of the White Paper on the completion of the Internal 
Market and the adoption of the Single European Act. This new 
expanded activity takes place in a political context which is still 
deficient in terms of democratic controls. The Community now 
extends its reach to a variety of spheres, such as the 
environment, technological research, telecommunications and 
the like. Indeed, plans which are right at the heart of the internal 
market may have an impact on human rights. Thus, for example, 
the abolition of frontier checks within the Community might 




























































































Integration in the field of information technology and the mass 
media may jeopardize the right to pluralism and the right of 
groups to safeguard their cultural and linguistic identity. An 
integrated market may pose greater threats to consumers’ rights 
to safety. By the same token, it can endanger some social rights 
such as the right to job security. Furthermore, greater freedom 
to move from one country to another may give rise to social 
resentment, discrimination, xenophobia and racism.
One of the only appropriate and peaceful weapons against 
these adverse effects of economic and social integration is 
human rights protection. The challenge is to render human 
rights more effective, and consequently less vulnerable to 
dangerous if gradual erosion, by implementing new remedies 
and enforcement procedures.
A Human Rights Action Plan limited to the field of 
application of Community law and directed to the specificities 
of the new European Single Market, would serve to put 
constraints on the Community rather than on Member States-, it 
would control the exercise of Community competences and 
provide an additional check on Community activities.
A Human Rights Action Plan is important as it would 
assure constitutional control in a period of rapid expansion in 
other fields.
C. A Human Rights Action Plan for an international actor
A Human Rights Action Plan is also important in the 
international context. One result of the 1992 programme and the 
Single European Act is the increased importance of the 
Community as an international actor by virtue of both the 
Community and European Political Cooperation frameworks. 
1992 has brought about an enhanced international visibility. It is 
no exaggeration to say that the eyes of an ever increasing 
number of nations are focused on Europe in a manner never 
before experienced. This coincides with a period in world 
politics in which sensitivity to human rights is making 
remarkable inroads well beyond the old liberal democracies. It 
would be strange, even bizzare, if the Community were not 




























































































D. What is a European identity? Where are our rights?
But above all, a Human Rights Action Plan would contribute to 
the fashioning of a European identity. What does it actually mean 
to ‘feel European? Surely the answer is extremely complex and 
probably not susceptible to exhaustive analysis.
Programmatically, all one can do is to suggest elements 
which may enhance that feeling. The Internal Market, as such, 
responds only partly to this exigency. It holds the promise of 
prosperity, of greater economic vitality, and of course of a 
breaking down of a variety of national barriers. Greater 
economic and social interaction will, it is expected, also enhance 
the sense of actually belonging to a greater polity, of being ‘at 
home’ anywhere in the Community. But that in itself is not 
enough; it is hardly a value with which people can identify or 
consider as part of their common heritage.
What, indeed, is the common heritage of the Community? 
The convenience of a Europe without frontiers is not actually a 
substitute for real positive values. Comparative experience of 
non-unitary systems on both sides of the Atlantic demonstrates 
that the notion of individual rights as an expression of shared 
values becomes one crucial element of identity. Part of feeling 
German or French, Canadian or American derives from the 
knowledge and security of belonging to a polity in which one 
has rights and shared beliefs of tolerance, liberty and freedom. 
It is not necessarily the vindication of these rights. With the 
exception of gender discrimination, most people in Western 
societies will pass their lives without ever personally confronting 
a violation of their fundamental human rights and hence the 
need to have recourse to protection. But the knowledge that 
these rights are respected, will be protected, and that one lives 
in a political society which takes them seriously becomes part of 
one’s group identity.
A Community Human Rights Action Plan will try to impart 




























































































II. What Kind of Action Plan Do we Need?
At first blush, the preoccupation with fundamental human rights 
in the European Community might seem as an indulgence of the 
affluent. By any comparative and relativist account, both the 
extent of Community violations of human rights and the level of 
protection afforded in such cases are not unsatisfactory. There 
are certainly no systematic, persistent and gross violations of 
human rights, and the mechanisms for redressing those 
violations which do occur tend to be adequate.
So what content, other than slogans for media 
consumption, may an Action Plan actually have? Even if, as 
argued above, there is a need for a reassertion of the 
Community’s commitment to human rights, would it not be 
enough simply to publicize the existing system?
We think not.
In the remainder of this Synthesis Report we set out in 
some detail the conclusions culled from the various specific 
reports of the Group of Experts. We first analyze the ‘acquis 
communautaire’, highlighting the achievements and lacunae in 
the present situation. Then we set out the major proposals 
raised by the Group of Experts. We have divided these into two 
sections: Normative Proposals dealing with the substantive 
content of human rights; and Methods of Protection dealing 
with mechanisms, devices and institutions to enhance the actual 
vindication of human rights.
In these introductory remarks we do not wish to 
anticipate the actual proposals but to explain the premises and 
philosophy that guided our thinking and choices.
A. An agenda not a blueprint
The title of our Report -  Agenda for a Human Rights Action Plan 




























































































should be considered by Community policy makers in 
elaborating an Action Plan. The Reports of the Group of Experts 
run to well over one thousand pages. We have cast our net wide 
and the catch has been correspondingly large. We do not 
believe that even the most ambitious plan could, or should, take 
on board all the proposals outlined. We do think that they 
should all be considered as part of an informed policy making 
process. Some proposals are contradictory; it will be a matter of 
policy which to prefer. Many of the proposals have advantages 
and disadvantages; thus frequently we have limited ourselves to 
point these out and leave it for others to weigh them in the 
balance. On occasion we have expressed our preference. Finally, 
in this synthesis we could not do justice to the richness of the 
full reports. In many ways we can only give pointers to the real 
discussion which is to be found in the actual reports.
B. Subsidiarity and synergy
The Community can not offer a panacea for all the social and 
economic problems of Europe; this is equally true in the field of 
human rights. Consequently, respectful of the principle of 
subsidiarity, we have tried to put emphasis only on those rights 
which derive from the specificity of the Community, and 
concentrate on action where the Community is clearly better 
placed than the Member States, or regional and universal 
organizations, to offer protection.
Similarly, we have not considered the Community in 
isolation. Effective protection will only result from an 
interaction between the different levels and systems of 
protection which already exist. Like it or not, individuals in 
Europe find themselves part of a State, of the Community, of 
the Council of Europe, and of the United Nations. Each of these 
must play their part. And just as the existence of, say, a list of 
fundamental rights and a constitutional court in Germany or Italy 
has not precluded German and Italian adhesion to, and 
participation in, the machinery of the Council of Europe, so it 
would seem unconvincing to suggest that the existence of these 
State and Regional systems absolves the Community from 




























































































C. Lex Lata -  A critical approach
We do not wish to denigrate the achievements to date. 
However, in analyzing the existing norms a critical approach is 
adopted, focussing not on that which works well, but on that 
which works less well, on the lacunae and shortcomings.
D. De Lege Ferenda
‘New’ rights and effective access to justice
In looking to the future, we have tried to suggest ways in which 
the Community can instigate normative and procedural 
improvements so as to ensure that the protection of human 
rights operates in a more effective way.
In normative terms, we have laid an overwhelming 
emphasis on what may be called ‘new’ human rights which, by 
their nature, pose the greatest challenge to a Community 
moving towards the year 2000. In particular, we have dealt with 
areas which correspond on the one hand, to new facets of our 
industrial society -  informatics, biotechnology, the environment 
and the like -  and, on the other hand, we have examined topics 
relating to the creation of the new European space. In some 
cases, like gender discrimination, we have revisited classical 
rights in the light of new sensitivities and conceptions.
As regards methods of protection, our approach can be 
easily summarized: we have identified as the main concern the 
need to make rights effective. Thus, while acknowledging the 
centrality of judicial review in the architecture of human rights, 
we have sought to show that the existence of a formal legal 
remedy is often not enough. Individuals may not be aware of the 
remedy, indeed of the violation; they may not have the money 
or the knowledge to invoke the remedy, and in many cases, 
such as the violation of diffuse and fragmented rights, an 
individual remedy is simply not ideal. We have thus searched 
and made proposals for procedural and institutional innovations 




























































































E. New problems and perspectives
(1) The abolition of frontiers
The removal of frontiers in Europe poses a number of human 
rights questions. As mentioned above, the abolition of frontier 
checks within the Community could lead to greater internal 
controls within Member States as well as at external Community 
frontiers. Already the Netherlands is considering the 
introduction (together with other measures) of identity cards 
(presumably in anticipation of 1993, or the completion of the 
objectives of the Schengen Treaty). These measures were, or will 
be, implemented independently of Community provisions and 
the mechanisms for their monitoring and control for 
conformity with human rights. If we place the abolition of 
frontiers in the context of racism, xenophobia, terrorism, drug 
trafficking and international crime, AIDS testing, refugee policy 
and the granting of asylum, it is clear that the human rights 
implications loom large.
Bearing in mind the General Declaration on Articles 13 to 
19 of the Single European Act, we can look forward to new 
crime fighting techniques, and increased vigilance as regards the 
legality of the presence of non-EC nationals in the Community. 
What has to be borne in mind is that in this case the threat to 
human rights does not come from the Community organs or 
agents, but from the dynamics of the drive towards the abolition 
of frontiers. Therefore, even if the Community were more 
accountable in law for human rights violations, Member States’ 
policy on refugees, combating crime, and surveillance of 
people’s movements in the Community, would fall outside 
Community accountability. Paradoxically, the Community has 
rights without responsibilities: rights to demand that Member 
States create a frontier-free Europe, but no responsibility to 
ensure that this is done in accordance with protection of human 
rights, this is left to national and international protection 
machinery.




























































































The political moves towards the implementation of the internal 
market is accompanied by, and dependent on, the formation of 
pan-European industries with enormous economic and social 
power; coupled with this are certain technical innovations which 
similarly deny the relevance of national frontiers within Europe. 
The creation of a single market will undoubtedly lead to a good 
deal of restructuring of the Community labour market. In other 
words those workers or enterprises which are not equipped to 
compete in a pan-European market will be made redundant. 
Unless Community citizens are really free to move throughout 
the Community as they search for work and retrain, there will 
be a frontier-free Community for producers and consumers but 
a barrier-ridden Europe for those looking for work. As long as, 
and to the extent that, unemployment benefits, housing 
allowances, family income supplements, etc., are not 
transferable, workers will be unable to retrain as demanded by 
the exigencies of the new single market. Not only would this 
hinder the efficiency and prosperity of the Common Market, 
but it would also lead to considerable human suffering.
Again, it is not the action of any one Community 
institution which can be pin-pointed but the reaction of market 
forces to the building of the internal market which is to blame. 
Clearly there could well be enormous benefits for all in the long 
term, however most of the studies carried out for the 
Community show that ‘far from negligible social effects will be 
caused in certain specific areas by the completion of the internal 
market. It is therefore necessary to take them into account and 
decide what specific Community action should be taken’ (.Social 
Europe, special edition, 1988). Such action will obviously include 
encouraging the ‘social dialogue’ (Art. 118B), and constructive 
use of the Social, Regional and Guidance Structural Funds. 
However a legally enforceable ‘floor of workers rights’ along the 
lines of that contained in the Social Charter may be crucial in this 
context. Such a move has the advantage that it would protect the 
human rights of marginalized and atypical workers. The 
alternatives: harmonization of minimum standards,
decentralization, or deregulation offer no such protection, 
indeed the first approach -  harmonization -  runs the risk of 




























































































against atypical workers (part-timers, homeworkers, married 
women, mothers, and mobile workers) by demanding 
dispositive conditions of eligibility for benefits such as: a certain 
number of hours per week and a particular length of service 
with the same employer. In the words of the Venturini report 
‘1992: The European Social Dimension’: ‘With regard to these 
questions, it should not be a matter of looking for deregulation, 
but rather of reregulating in more appropriate ways.’
New technology coupled with Europe-wide reorganization 
of business will have an immediate impact on the workforce. 
The Community has already moved in order to insure some 
forms of protection in areas such as: collective redundancies, 
the protection of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, and the 
protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer. Although such regulation is hardly ever described as 
human rights legislation, it is the restructuring of industry in the 
context of the internal market which could lead to the greatest 
suffering for Community citizens. The need to protect the 
‘social dimension’ in the process of market integration has been 
constantly reaffirmed by all the Community institutions. It is 
suggested that it is in this sphere that the Community not only 
poses the greatest threat to human dignity, but also potentially 
offers some of the greatest possibilities for protection. Just as 
the Community primarily grants economic rights to economic 
actors, it must primarily be concerned with protecting the 
social rights of its citizens faced with the dynamics of a single 
European Economic Community.
Technological change not only has consequences for 
Community workers but also for Community citizens generally. 
The advent of satellite television not only offers opportunities 
for a greater understanding and identity in Europe but also 
poses new human rights questions (concerning freedom of 
information and expression) which inevitably have to be 
answered at the supranational level. Similarly, the transborder 
flow of information through electronic mailing systems together 
with the arrival of multinational data banks means that often 
national legislators are ill-equipped to really ensure the 




























































































confidential, personal or private information, but nowadays can 
include details of one’s genetic make-up, sero-positivity etc. In 
such areas Community law would often have supremacy so that 
priority would have to be given to the four freedoms (free 
movement of persons, freedom to provide services, free 
movement of goods and free movement of capital). As long as 
there is no real guidance as to how these freedoms may be 
limited in order to protect human rights, there is a danger that 
fundamental human rights can be easily violated with no 
recourse to legal protection. In a Europe where huge 
corporations with enormous technological capacities operate 
on a transnational basis these questions are of crucial 
importance.
(3) The gender perspective
European Community law gives a central place to non­
discrimination and sex equality as general principles of law. For 
this reason, new gender perspectives can not be ignored. 
Obviously questions concerning pornography, abortion, 
contraception, surrogacy, medical experimentation, etc., will be 
particularly controversial. However these matters are more and 
more likely to fall within the field of Community law. Human 
rights law offers no easy answers to these questions; however, 
inclusion of such a gender perspective may ensure that a wider 
range of points of view are considered in the decision-making 
process. Such a perspective seeks to resituate the debate. For 
example, instead of judging pornography for the corrupting 
effect it has on the male consumer, one looks at the harm it has 
for potential victims -  women who may be the victims of 
exploitation within the industry, women who may be subjected 
to sexual attacks, and women who may suffer the effects of 
general sexual discrimination and prejudice.
In the end, it may be that non-discrimination provisions 
alone are ineffective when it comes to tackling discrimination 
against women. It may be that positive action programmes will 
play the most important role in the future. The Council 
Recommendation of 13th December 1984 on the promotion of 
positive action for women has no legally binding force and as 




























































































promote equality through positive action. If women in the 
Community are to achieve more than ‘formal equality before the 
law’, there will have to be action in areas which go beyond pay, 
pensions, and social security. There is no reason why, if the 
Community is to take women seriously, it should not investigate 
initiatives relating to sexual harassment at work, domestic 
violence, rape crisis centres, child care facilities, contraception, 
and medical experimentation on women. The construction of a 
Community (or internal market) where men and women enjoy 
real equality of opportunity will depend on whether the 
Community takes into account the full implications of the 
gender perspective.
Another question which arises in this context is 
discrimination against homosexuals. Such discrimination has 
been the subject of a Resolution of the European Parliament in 
1984, a Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe in 1981, and is specifically outlawed in more 
recent Human Rights Charters (such as the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms). Futhermore, the arrival of the 
AIDS virus has led to violent prejudice and discrimination 
against gays. This has particularly far-reaching consequences in 
the employment, housing and insurance spheres. At the 
moment, questions concerning insurance are often regulated 
through national self-imposed codes of practice. In the event of 
a single European market for insurance, such codes could 
become uncompetitive, with the result that perceived high risk 
candidates would be simply excluded from these areas of 
economic life. Again a Community human rights perspective 




























































































III. The Story so far -  the European Court's 
‘acquis’ and Community Action Concerning 
Human Rights
The Community response to these problems and 
developments could be to offer its citizens legally enforceable 
rights with specially adopted methods of protection and 
enforcement.
Rights are an especially useful instrument within the legal 
order of the European Community, due to the particular nature 
of Community law. In a crucial early case the European Court of 
Justice expressed the nature of Community law as follows: 
‘Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community 
law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is 
also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of 
their legal heritage.’ ( Van Gend en Loos Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1, 
12) The Court was here referring to rights in the Treaty of Rome 
in the context of the elimination of customs duties; however, all 
sorts of rights for individuals now arise under Community law: 
rights under regulations and directives, rights to legal certainty, 
the principle of proportionality, the right of confidentiality in 
lawyer-client correspondence, and lastly human or fundamental 
rights. This last category is special because these are the rights 
which historically have been considered ‘inviolable’, 
‘inalienable’, ‘natural’, ‘basic’ and endowed with a special moral 
force.
However, it is exactly these rights which have a confused 
and ambiguous status within the Community legal order, and 
which have a vital role in the future of the Community as it 
moves towards an internal market.
It would seem that there is some convergence concerning 
some rights known as ‘fundamental rights’. Most importantly all 
the Community Member States have ratified the Council of 
Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and 
all have made the appropriate declarations allowing for 
individual petition to the European Commission of Human 




























































































(Art.46). Although this Convention is not incorporated into the 
Community legal system we should mention the Joint 
Declaration by the three Community institutions on 
Fundamental Rights of 5th April 1977 which stresses the 
importance that these institutions attach to fundamental rights as 
derived in particular from the Constitutions of the Member 
States and the European Convention on Human Rights. Such a 
Declaration adds a certain moral and political force to the 
protection of human rights in the Community legal order, but 
one can not pretend that it creates any additional remedies or 
procedures. It may be that the insertion in the Single European 
Act of two preambular paragraphs expressing the Member 
States’ determination to work together to promote and display 
democracy on the basis of fundamental rights will have knock- 
on legal effects, but for the moment this declaration of intent 
has had little impact on the lives of Community Citizens.
Many have hailed the courageous steps taken by the Court 
of Justice in this field. Not only has the Court been prepared to 
go beyond a strict minimum of protection, a lowest common 
denominator to the constitutional order of the Member States, 
but it has asserted Community rights such as ‘the principle of 
proportionality’ which are already filtering back into the legal 
orders of those Member States where no such rights existed. 
However the Court has no written catalogue of human rights to 
work from. Its method and pronouncements are therefore 
rather vague and one is always aware that a fundamental priority 
for the Court is to achieve economic integration in accordance 
with the objectives of the Community. When these objectives, 
or the methods used to achieve them, conflict with human 
rights principles, there is little evidence that the Court has the 





























































































In order to understand in greater detail the role of human 
rights in the Community system, it may be helpful to make the 
following distinctions:
A. rights operating in relation to national authorities and private 
bodies outside the scope of Community law;
B. rights in the field of Community law;
C. rights protected against action by Community institutions or 
agents;
D. rights which might be granted or created by the Community; 
mostly this concerns what could be called social rights (such as 
those found in the European Social Charter [1961]) and citizens’ 
rights (such as voting, residence, and participatory rights);
E. rights of people in third countries;.
A. Rights outside the scope of Community law
The first category covers questions which arise outside the 
scope of Community law. These might be measures taken by a 
national authority, say concerning: the death penalty, military 
service, the control of public assemblies, or the detention of 
terrorists without trial. In such cases, the victims of human rights 
abuses will have recourse to domestic courts under national 
legislation, and eventually to the Strasbourg Commission and 
Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Justice at 
Luxembourg has no competence to decide such matters. Few 
people would suggest that the Community should move into 
this sphere and provide another layer of judicial protection.
B. Rights arising in the field of Community law
This category includes rights in the field of Community law 
which arise at the national level within the framework of 
Community law. These rights are found in hundreds of 




























































































cover areas such as the free movement of workers, rights of 
establishment, freedom to provide services, non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality, and the principle that men and 
women should receive equal pay for equal work. If we add to 
this, secondary Community legislation such as directives (for 
example on sex discrimination) together with regulations and 
decisions, we have a vast honeycomb of Community provisions 
covering nearly every area of economic life. However, it is worth 
pointing out that these rights should be considered 
jfundamental Community rights’ rather than 'universal human 
rights’. This is because their enforcement may depend on being 
a Community national or the Community transnational context 
in which they operate. Human rights such as those found in the 
European Convention on Human Rights are universal and 
granted to anyone within the jurisdiction of the Contracting 
Parties regardless of nationality.
Treaty provisions, regulations, directives, and decisions are 
all capable of granting individual enforceable rights and duties at 
the national level. But what happens when C om m unity  
provisions such as these conflict with human rights contained in 
international treaties and enshrined in the Constitutions of some 
of the Member States?
It is suggested that according to the European Court of 
Justice a distinction has to be drawn between national legislation 
operating in the field of Community law and national authorities 
implementing provisions of Community law.
(1) National Legislation operating in the field of Community law
These legislative provisions can not at present be reviewed by 
the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg for compliance 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (and 
presumably other non-EC human rights). This is implied by the 
Cinetheque case where the Court stated that: ‘Although it is true 
that it is the duty of this Court to ensure observance of 
fundamental rights in the field of Community law, it has no 
power to examine the compatibility with the European 




























































































case, an area which falls within the jurisdiction of the national 
legislator.’ This case involved French restrictions on the sale of 
videocassettes of cinematographic works which were about to 
be shown or had recently been shown at the cinema. The 
legislation imposed a ban on the sale of the videocassette for a 
certain period following the release of the film in cinemas. The 
aim of the legislation was to preserve and protect the French 
cinema industry. Although the importation of videocassettes 
clearly falls within Community law, the Court declined to deal 
with the compatibility of the legislation with human rights law as 
found in the ECHR. Incidentally, both the Advocate General and 
the Commission felt the legislation was compatible with Art. 10 
ECHR (Freedom of expression and freedom to receive and 
impart information).
(2) National authorities implementing Community provisions
The history of the Court’s jurisprudence on this question has 
been analyzed in great detail, and the background is well known. 
Even though proposals for insertion of a provision guaranteeing 
political and fundamental rights were rejected when the 
Community Treaties were drafted, the Court has gradually 
incorporated the protection of fundamental rights as a general 
principle of Community law. This came about against a 
background of discontent in the Constitutional Courts of Italy 
and Germany, which had suggested that they may one day have 
to review Community provisions for compatibility with basic 
human rights. The European Court of Justice having rejected 
arguments based on human rights principles found in national 
law in an early case in 1959, later stated in the Stauder Case (1969) 
that ‘the fundamental human rights are enshrined in the general 
principles of Community law and protected by the Courtly 
However this was merely obiter and hardly a very concrete 
assertion of the rights which merit protection. In the Second 
Nold Case (1974) the Court went further and explained that:
In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw 
inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the 




























































































which are incompatible with fundamental rights 
recognized and protected by the constitutions of those 
states. Similarly, international treaties for the protection of 
human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework 
of Community law.(Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491, 507)
However we can not forget that the European Court of 
Justice is the guardian of the EC Treaties and that it has stated 
categorically that ‘The protection of such rights, whilst inspired 
by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
must be ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the Community (Case 11/70 [1970] ECR 1125, 
1134). This means that human rights values will have to be 
interpreted and weighted in the light of the exigencies 
demanded by European integration. It has to be admitted that 
although the Court has increasingly referred to the Convention, 
the European Social Charter, international treaties, and 
constitutional principles and traditions, the rights contained 
therein have not really been developed or used to strike down 
Community provisions.
In only one case has an individual really benefited from the 
European Convention on Human Rights in this context. In the 
Kent Kirk case (63/83 [1984] ECR 2689, 2718) the Court stated 
that:
The principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive 
effect is one which is common to all the legal orders of the 
Member States and is enshrined in Article 7 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms as a fundamental right; it takes its place 
among the general principles of law whose observance is 
ensured by the Court of Justice.
This is the clearest statement in the field. It may be that it 
is only a question of time before a suitable case comes before 
the Court and some real case law is developed. For the moment 
we have to conclude that the Court’s case law leaves no clues as 




























































































Constitutional principles, traditions, practices, precepts or ideas 
are unhelpful. Even if such things existed the Court’s method so 
far has been to selectively distill common practices from some 
Member States (in the Hauer case the Court examined Germany, 
Italy and Ireland) and even then these only offer ‘inspiration’ or 
‘guidelines’. It is possible that in searching for a common 
standard the Court may be reduced to finding a bare minimum 
of protection which falls below what would be accepted in most 
of the Member States. Furthermore, even if it seeks a maximum 
standard, Constitutions will reflect different political cultures in 
very different countries, so rights can not be simply selected, 
extracted and accumulated. For instance, there may be a careful 
constitutional balance between the right to strike and the right 
to work, or the right to compensation in cases of nationalization 
may be counterbalanced with a severely progressive taxation 
system.
Clearly the Court had to assert its jurisdiction over the 
compatibility of Community provisions with human rights. This 
it has done. However, apart from the ban on retroactive penal 
measures, we are still in the dark as to exactly which human 
rights operate in this sphere. The present methodology of the 
Court is unlikely to yield simple results.
C. Rights against Community institutions or agents
This section raises a different problem. Whereas the measures 
discussed above can be scrutinized for human rights 
compliance either at the national level or at Strasbourg under 
the Convention machinery, action taken by Community organs 
can only be reviewed by the European Court of Justice. The 
European Commission of Human Rights has rejected 
applications against Community bodies simply stating that the 
Community is not a party to the Convention. (One could 
attempt to distinguish these cases as involving acts which take 
effect within the framework of the European Communities. 
Should a Community act have effects reaching beyond a strict 
Community context it may one day be held to invoke the 




























































































This means that the only protection available to victims is 
to be found at the European Court of Justice. This Court has 
examined the action of Community organs for compliance with 
the rights contained in the European Convention. Questions of 
religious discrimination, invasion of privacy, and due process 
under Article 6 ECHR have all been considered. The Community 
was found to be justified in all these cases.
In most states, legislative and administrative measures can 
be challenged before an independent authority. Often there 
may be a filter procedure so that prospective legislation can be 
amended so that it conforms with constitutional rights. 
Although the European Court of Justice has declared that it will 
ensure that Community action conforms with fundamental 
rights, it may be that judicial protection after the event is not the 
best form of protection.
If citizens do not know about the effect of Community 
provisions they can not challenge them; if citizens have no 
resources they can not mount a successful challenge; if citizens 
do not have a direct and individual concern they do not have the 
right to go to the Court; by the time the Court hears the case 
there may already be hundreds of victims all over the 
Community. For these reasons it is not particularly apposite that 
protection be left in the hands of the Court alone. Furthermore, 
human rights’ violations by the Community are not particularly 
visible. The Community does not hang, torture or imprison 
people, nor does it have a record of genocide, slavery or 
systematic racial discrimination. However, its action may still 
have far-reaching effects on the social and economic lives of its 
citizens, and due to the very nature of its procedures provisions 
and decisions are not made in the glare of public attention. 
There is a certain secrecy and obscurity about the decision­
making process. Just as other bureaucracies and legislative 
bodies are subjected to checks and balances, the Community 
organs too could create their own watch-dog. This is dealt with 




























































































D. Rights which might be granted or created by the 
Community
(1) Social rights
The legal questions which arose in parts A, B, and C are really 
rather far removed from the lives of most Community citizens. 
As soon as we move from the rights guaranteed in the European 
Convention towards a wider definition of human rights, we find 
rights which touch everyday life: rights to social security and 
education, rights of workers, rights to the environment, etc. 
However, we are now no longer talking exclusively about legally 
enforceable rights, but about rights which the Parliament, the 
Commission, the Economic and Social Committee, and 
Community citizens would like to see proclaimed by the 
Community and, where possible, enforced.
Most recently a great deal of attention has been given to 
the compilation of a Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights. This type of social legislation is not universally popular 
with all the Member State governments. However, the Charter is 
not supposed to be legally enforceable but it would be a 
Declaration by the Heads of State or Government that ‘Member 
States commit themselves to take such steps as are appropriate 
and to mobilize all the resources that may be necessary in order 
to guarantee the fundamental social rights contained in this 
Charter...’
It is not easy to see exactly how such a Charter would 
eventually operate to bolster the protection of fundamental 
rights. It is enough to state that just as judicial protection is 
insufficient to protect civil and political rights, so Charters, 
Declarations, and Resolutions are not effective instruments for 
social protection. Not only does social protection need a firm 
legal basis on a par with the protection of economic freedom, 
but it also needs to be enforced through national actors at 
several levels, most importantly at the level of the ‘social 
dialogue’ between the two sides of industry. The issue of social 




























































































(2) Citizens’ rights in a People’s Europe
The 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European identity led to a 
decision at the Paris summit (1974) to set up a working party 
with instructions to ‘study the condition and timing under which 
the citizens of the nine Member States could be given special 
rights as members of the Community’.
The Tindemans Report on European Union proposed 
among other things: the protection of the rights o f Europeans 
where this can no longer be guaranteed solely by individual 
States.
The report then identified three areas. The first area was 
fundamental rights in the face of the gradual increase of the 
powers of the European institutions. The second area was 
consumer rights and the third, protection of the environment.
Following the Fontainebleau European Council meeting in 
1974, an ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe was set up. 
Two reports were then presented to the European Council. The 
first concentrates on ‘easing of rules and practices which cause 
irritation to Community citizens and undermine the credibility 
of the Community’ and also on ‘wider opportunities for 
employment and residence.’ The second report concentrates 
on citizens’ rights such as voting rights in European and local 
elections, consultation on transfrontier issues, as well as covering 
areas such as the promotion of culture, education and sport, 
volunteer work in Third World development, health, social 
security and dmgs.
We have come a long way from the early questions 
concerning the exact status of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in the Community legal order. However, it is in 
this area of a People's Europe that the Community stands to 
achieve most success, with immediate results for Community 
citizens.
Mention might be made of some of the programmes 
which have been put into operation as a result of the People’s 




























































































programme for cooperation between universities and industry 
in the field of advanced technological training; in 1987, the 
Erasmus programme was implemented; in 1988, the YES for 
Europe youth exchange programme was adopted by the 
Council, and in 1989, the Lingua programme which encourages 
foreign language teaching was adopted. In more general terms, 
the Community is moving to tackle questions of pollution, the 
protection of the ozone layer, and radioactive contamination of 
foodstuffs.
As far as a frontier-free Europe is concerned, hundreds of 
measures are continually being elaborated and implemented. It 
would not be appropriate to go into the details here, and many 
of these measures arise in the context of the different reports. 
Some of the rights offered by the Community in the context of 
the internal market could be seen as human rights: the right to 
leave one’s country and return, non discrimination on grounds 
of nationality (between Community nationals), the right to 
broadcast information across frontiers and so on. But we still 
have to ask whether the main aim of these rights is merely to 
facilitate the better operation of an unregulated single market, or 
whether they will be adopted taking full cognizance of the need 
to protect the dignity of Community citizens. The arrival of 
these new rights could mean we lose the old ones: if speeding 
up frontier formalities means reading a bar code from a 
European passport and the information contained in the data 
bank is not controlled in accordance with respect for private 
life (Article 8 ECHR), human rights in the Community will have 
taken one step forwards and two steps back. The challenge for 
the Community would now seem to be twofold: firstly to ensure 
that new provisions operate so as to respect the human rights of 
its citizens, and secondly to implement some system so that 
these provisions can be judged for their compatability with 
established human rights norms. As was seen above, the legal 
landscape is presently littered with craters so that citizens 
wishing to challenge action for compliance with fundamental 
human rights may often find themselves trapped without 





























































































(3) The European Parliament’s April 1989 Declaration of 
Fundamental Rights
The pressure for a written Community catalogue of fundamental 
rights has been constant ever since the 60s when the Court 
asserted that violations of human rights in the Community 
sphere are inconsistent with Community law. The Declaration of 
the European Parliament is the first measure which responds in 
a concrete way to the call for a written catalogue.
The immediate political genesis of the Declaration may be 
traced to Article 4 of the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union which foresaw the adoption by the Union of its own 
declaration on fundamental rights ‘...in accordance with the 
procedure for revision laid down in Article 84 of [the] Treaty.’ It 
was thus that the Institutional Committee of the Parliament (as 
the Committee responsible in the area of Treaty reform) seized 
the initiative in promoting the Declaration.
No single reason can explain the motivation for the 
adoption of the Declaration or its rationale.
From a strictly legal point of view, the Declaration was 
perceived as a response to the widely perceived weakness in the 
current system of protection: the absence of a written catalogue 
encapsulating the rights to which the Court would give 
protection. It should however be pointed out that not all 
commentators share the view that the absence of such a written 
catalogue was indeed a serious lacuna nor that a declaration of 
the European Parliament could, strictly speaking, fill that gap.
It is, however, submitted that this strictly legal argument 
was not the principal raison d ’etre for the adoption of the 
Declaration. Far more important in the minds of the 
Parliamentary promoters of the Declaration was the hope that 
its adoption would achieve a double symbolism. On the one 
hand, it was forcefully argued that the Declaration could become 
one element in the building of a European identity for 
Community citizens and residents: an important statement 
about what it means to belong to the Community. Views differ 




























































































it would depend on the level of public awareness of the 
existence and usefulness of the Declaration. To date, such 
awareness has been negligible. On the other hand, adoption of 
the Declaration was meant to be a symbolic act demonstrating 
the preoccupation of Parliament and its concern for the welfare 
of Community citizens. This explains, perhaps, the urgency in 
trying to steer the Declaration through the Parliamentary 
process before the 1989 elections.
The ultimate importance and impact of the Declaration 
will depend on the reaction it receives from the other organs of 
the Community, and in particular from the European Court of 
Justice. Ideally, from the perspective of the promoters of the 
Declaration, a common institutional statement endorsing the 
Declaration coupled with recourse to it in the jurisprudence of 
the Court will generate incrementally a greater awareness 
amongst lawyers and ultimately among the general public
Details of the legal philosophy and juridical value of the 
Declaration can be found in the report ‘Methods of Protection’. 
We shall deal with the future prospects of the Declaration in 
section V: ‘Methods of Protection’.
E. Rights of people in third Countries
The Commission has so far refused to develop a legal basis for a 
Community human rights policy, stating that such a move would 
take them outside the objectives of the Community.
However the European Parliament is active in this area and 
since 1983 has been adopting reports on ‘human rights in the 
world and Community policy on human rights’. This work is 
carried out by the Political Affairs Committee and the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights. These bodies have 
competence only over human rights in non-Community 
countries. These reports limit themselves to three rights: the 
right to life, the right to respect for the physical and moral 





























































































Since the beginning of the 1970’s Parliament has been 
active in a number of areas including joint meetings with the 
Latin American Parliament, ASEAN (the interparliamentary 
organization), in CSCE, and in the ACP/CEE Joint Assembly. 
Apart from numerous resolutions on human rights all over the 
world the Parliament is also involved in a certain amount of ‘case 
work’, and may lend its platform to victims of human rights 
abuses. Most recently Parliament has used its new powers under 
Article 238 EEC Treaty as amended by the Single European Act. 
This Article requires that agreements concluded between the 
Community and third States need the assent of Parliament acting 
by an absolute majority of its component members. Relying on 
this Article, Parliament has refused to give its assent to Protocols 
concerning Israel and Turkey on grounds of human rights 
violations. As the Community enters into more and more 
external agreements this control by the Parliament may be of 
increasing importance. It has been suggested that this new 
power may enable Parliament to achieve its desire that human 
rights provisions be inserted into external agreements and 
development programmes.
One might briefly mention that the Commission also plays 
an important role in this area. Not only is it formally linked to 
European Political Cooperation and charged with ensuring 
appropriate relations with the organs of the United Nations 
(Article 229 EEC), but it also takes its own initiatives. Examples 
include its appeal to the South African authorities concerning 
the imposition of the death penalty for the Sharpeville Six, and 
the condemnation of the South African intervention in 
Botswana in 1988. Initiatives on human rights matters are usually 
the responsibility of the Commissioner whose portfolio covers 
the country concerned. So far the Commission has rejected 
Parliament’s proposals that aid and development agreements 
should be drafted so that human rights violations might permit 
sanctions to be implemented.
In the end it could be said that the biggest threat to human 
rights in third countries may be the Community itself. Should 
the Community become protectionist vis-à-vis Third World 
countries, or fail to ensure that trade and development policy 




























































































improvements there, rather than useful raw materials here, then 
it will be the economics of the European Economic Community 
which will be the cause of the denial of basic rights in the Third 
World. Moreover, it remains to be seen to what extent any 
Community common immigration, refugee or asylum policies 
will respect the human rights of people from non-Community 
countries.
IV. Areas where Normative Action Might be 
Taken
As was stated above this project only touches tangentially on 
questions of classic rights (right to life, right not to be tortured, 
to public assembly, to fair trial, to freedom of religion, etc.). The 
main emphasis has been placed on rights which are particularly 
relevant either in view of new challenges posed by increasing 
economic and social integration and the run up to 1993, or on 
account of new challenges posed by the latest technological 
developments.
A. The strains on human rights posed by the integration
process
(1) Social and economic rights
This is an area where the Community institutions have produced 
an impressive body of legislation, for example, in the area of 
equal pay for men and women, collective redundancies, hours of 
work and holidays, training and new information technology, 
poverty, unemployment among women, migrant workers, 
employment of disabled people, etc. In addition to a host of 
specific Community acts, some general documents or 
instruments have also been adopted. Suffice it to mention the 
1988 Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Working Party of 
the EC Commission, the Opinion adopted on 22 February 1989 
by the Economic and Social Committee, the Declaration of 
Fundamental Rights adopted on 12 April 1989 by the Parliament 
(it includes a number of economic and social rights), as well as 





























































































In spite of a conspicuous body of general as well as 
specific standards, a number of problems remain that require 
some action by the EC. We shall emphasize only three of them.
First, there are considerable differences in the systems of 
economic and industrial relations of the Twelve Member States. 
In this sphere, national legislation, case-law, custom and practice 
all vary enormously from country to country. It follows that 
when workers start benefiting from full freedom of movement 
in 1993, they will of necessity have to face a remarkably different 
treatment in the host country from that which they were 
accustomed to in their country of origin. This, for instance, 
applies to social security, collective bargaining, the right to a 
basic minimum wage, the right to rest and leisure, etc. In these 
and related areas, one can discern varying degrees of recognition 
in the various Member States, with some of them reaching high 
levels of refinement and others granting less extensive rights.
Second, a unified market will of necessity result in making 
some classes of workers more vulnerable to economic 
processes, due to lack of adequate training, skills or 
qualifications. Collective redundancies, transfers of undertakings, 
insolvency, dismissals, reduction of working hours, etc. will 
affect a great number of workers. All this will also follow from 
the two phenomena outlined in Part II above: transformation or 
merger of enterprises as a result of major technological 
innovations; changes or restructuring of firms due to the need to 
face an increase in competition in a unified common market.
Third, new classes of workers are increasingly evident. The 
so-called atypical workers (home workers, workers on job­
sharing schemes, part-timers, temporaries, people combining 
housework or childcare and employment, or employment and 
training, fake self-employed, teleworkers, subcontractors, 
persons engaged in clandestine work in the grey or black 
economy, etc.). These new forms of work are not transitory but 
structural phenomena pre-figuring the forms that work 




























































































Plainly, it is imperative for the Community to give a 
response to these problems. Three questions arise in this 
context. First, in what areas should the Community take action 
to contribute to the solution of those problems? Second, by 
what methods? Third, what procedural and institutional changes 
are needed?
As regards the first idea, one may indicate six basic social 
rights, where some form of uniform regulation should be 
reached at Community level, and in addition four areas where 
the Community should strive to establish at least general 
guidelines. The six fundamental rights are: 1) the right to a 
general wage standard or a basic minimum wage to combat low 
pay (which is caused primarily by segmentation of the labour 
market); 2) the right to a certain length of working day as well as 
to rest and leisure; in this area general standards should 
determine normal weekly working times, regulate night work, 
fix ceilings on overtime working, provide for periods of weekly 
rest, public holidays and paid annual leave; 3) the right to job 
security, in particular a right against discrimination in 
recruitment or preferences for certain groups, a right to 
employment continuity (through temporary suspension on 
various conditions), in case of maternity, parental obligations, 
public activities, military service, illness, and so on, as well as a 
right to protection in the advent of termination of the contract 
of employment; 4) a right against discrimination on grounds of 
sex, race, religion, language, birth, economic position, 
education, etc.; 5) a right to social welfare benefits; 6) freedom 
of association, the right of collective bargaining as well as the 
right to strike.
While in the six aforementioned items the principal aim 
should be to achieve some harmonization of the legal regulation 
of the Twelve, there are four other areas which stand out both 
because they are related to new social and industrial phenomena 
typical of the 1990s, and because they constitute areas where it 
would be much more difficult to achieve harmonization; 
consequently, the goal should be to attain flexible and general 
standards which can be adjusted to the varying conditions of 
each State. The first area is that of restructuring labour in the 




























































































prompted by plant modernisation or mergers or changes due 
to greater competition. Here it would be important to strive for 
a mixture of collective and individual entitlements concerning: 
health and safety risks arising from changes introduced during 
the restructuring process; redundancy and economic dismissal; 
changes in working time and their implications for the 
employee affected; consequences of new technology on the 
skills and working conditions of the employees; participation of 
representatives of the workforce in the process of 
restructuring.
The second area concerns the atypical workers referred to 
above. They should be fully integrated and assimilated within 
labour law and social security law. It may be important to ensure 
that any minimum rights granted to this group of workers 
should be enforceable horizontally, that is to say directly against 
the employer. Horizontal enforcement is important in such 
cases as atypical workers are often excluded from the social 
dialogue and therefore denied the rights protection which 
accrues from collective bargaining.
The third area relates to health and safety of workers at 
work. Here one might suggest that action be taken to provide: a 
legal basis for the rights of workers’ representatives in health 
and safety; representatives’ rights to information and 
consultation, or to carry out inspection; their right to halt the 
work of an enterprise; their right to time off to carry out their 
duties; the facilities to which they are entitled and special 
protection against dismissal or discrimination.
The fourth area concerns the promotion of positive action 
for women. As the constitutional and legal structures of Member 
States are not always clear as to the legal status of various forms 
of positive action against sex discrimination, and in some cases 
the status quo is actually hostile, one of the goals should be to lay 
down a general principle of interpretation which among other 
things would legitimize positive action so as not to characterize 





























































































Let us now turn to the method for putting all these 
objectives into practice. It is suggested that while the 
Community institutions should formulate broad standards in the 
aforementioned fields (possibly in a Directive), the best way of 
fleshing out and elaborating them should be by means of the 
social dialogue envisaged in Art. 118B of EEC Treaty as amended 
by the Single European Act. The social dialogue, that is, 
collective bargaining between the social partners within 
Member States as well as at the European level, should be used 
for developing and specifying the actual contents and means of 
implementation of the various fundamental rights listed above. 
However, there are a number of ambiguities surrounding 
Articles 100A(2) and 118, a Treaty amendment should put the 
social dimension of the Community on a firmer basis.
More specifically one way forward might be an instrument 
for social and economic rights which avoids the political 
obstacles inherent in entrenching substantive rights at the 
Community level. This instrument could primarily promote the 
social dialogue, and only secondarily specify the contents of the 
rights to be included. The framework would be based on firstly, 
a series of Community incentives and resources which would 
encourage the inculcation of the values enshrined in the 
Community instrument. Secondly, new machinery would be 
established which would operate at the national and/or 
Community level to resolve deadlocks over collective 
agreements concerned with fundamental rights. Thirdly, there 
would be entrenched a ‘right to strike over violations of 
fundamental rights, or in the event of impasse in negotiating 
agreements on such rights’. The protection offered by this right 
would be equivalent to the maximum protection accorded to 
strike action by that State. In this way the most appropriate 
protection would be evolved at the national level, but where the 
social dialogue fails concerning Community fundamental social 
and economic rights, the Community legal order would offer a 
new form of protection. (This option is outlined in much more 





























































































The Single European Act includes several provisions concerning 
environmental protection. These represent the germs of a 
constitutionalization of a Community policy towards the 
environment. Not only is environmental protection to be a 
component of the Community’s other policies, but where 
measures concerning environmental protection are adopted 
with the aim of establishing the internal market they must take 
as a base a ‘high level of protection’.
There are a number of difficulties surrounding the 
development of a fundamental right to environmental 
protection and/or integrating environmental protection as an 
objective constitutional ‘national goal’. Most of the difficulties 
surrounding a simplistic rights-based approach arise out of the 
very nature of environmental questions. For example, if one 
relies on individual harm or economic loss as one’s starting 
point, complex long term effects will show up too late. In 
addition, rights are not ideal tools in this situation as the conflicts 
and interests are often diffuse and fragmented, so that 
environmental decisions involve a complex web of actors: 
legislators, the administration, judges, the polluter, the victims, 
interest groups, and those that are economically dependent on 
the polluters. The solution may be to favour the elaboration of 
participation and information rights at the Community level.
As far as concerns constitutionalizing environmental 
protection at the Community level, such a move can not be 
assessed merely with respect to its immediate legal 
consequences. Not only would the proclamation of 
environmental protection as a constitutional Community goal 
encourage political integration but it would also indirectly 
influence: the exercise of individual subjective rights, the 
relationship and cooperation between the legislator, 
administration, and judiciary, as well as the constitutional weight 
to be given to strengthening procedural requirements (in 
particular the role of environmental impact assessment studies, 





























































































At the normative level, environmental protection should 
be given a stronger emphasis as a Community objective. Rights 
to participation, cooperation, and information could be 
constitutionalized so that environmental decision-making can 
better anticipate potentially hazardous effects.
(3) Consumer rights
Generally speaking, consumer rights embrace two broad 
categories: 1) rights to protection against economic ‘risks’ 
resulting from: unfair marketing practices, unbalanced or unfair 
rights and duties contained in contract terms, economic 
overcharging, etc.; 2) rights to protection against risks resulting 
from dangerous products such as unsafe consumer goods, 
useless or insufficiently tested medicines, contaminated food, 
pesticides, chemicals, etc.
Of these two categories, the latter is the one which has 
more direct relevance to the person in the street and in addition 
has acquired a more dramatic dimension. We can call all the 
rights comprised in this category ‘rights of consumers to safety’.
It is obvious to everyone that consumers’ health and safety 
is increasingly imperilled by the spread of unsafe products in 
every field and over transnational borders. Suffice it to mention 
that at present around 45 million people suffer from some sort 
of product-related accident at home, 80,000 of such accidents 
being fatal. Even more alarming is the fact that in the 
Community 25,000 children die each year due to accidents at 
home, mostly resulting from suffocation, poisoning or burning.
It stands to reason, first, that risks and dangers to 
consumers’ health are caused by private bodies (enterprises, 
national or transnational firms, etc.) and that, second, 
restrictions, controls, regulations and sanctions can only be 
imposed by public entities, that is by Member States or the 
Community institutions. The problem therefore arises of seeing 
whether and to what extent public actors have restrained or can 





























































































The European Community has not been inactive in this 
field. Due to the fact that at the start it was not granted 
competence to regulate with binding force, scrutinize or 
enforce the protection of consumers’ safety, it has had to face 
from the outset the problem of how to reconcile two somewhat 
conflicting needs.- the need to ensure free and unimpeded 
circulation of goods in the Common Market, without any 
distortion or restriction, and the need to allow Member States to 
prevent or restrict the importation of goods posing risks for 
safety and health. The balance was struck by laying down in 
Articles 30-34 of the Treaty of Rome, the abolition of quantitative 
restrictions on the importation of goods, and then establishing 
in Art. 36 an exception whereby Member States can ban or 
restrict the importation of goods, among other things, for the 
sake of protecting the health and the life of consumers. By and 
large the philosophy behind the Treaty of Rome in this area was 
thus to leave to Member States the task of providing for the 
health and security of consumers, while entrusting to 
Community institutions the limited task of promoting and 
harmonizing State policies for the protection of consumers.
Over the years, the Community has however taken a host 
of important initiatives. Thus, in 1976, in the hey-day of 
consumer protection, it adopted a ‘Consumer Policy 
Programme’, based on the idea that strong public action was 
needed to impose duties on private actors. A ‘Second 
Consumer Programme’, adopted in 1981, reflected the 
emergence of a general anti-regulatory tendency. It relied on 
incentives for co-operation, on the corporate responsibility of 
undertakings and of ‘soft law’ techniques replacing public 
intervention in the general interest of consumers. A third 
scheme was adopted in 1985: the ‘New Impulse for Consumer 
Protection’. Although it took up and further developed the 
approach chosen in 1981, the ‘New Impulse’ is important, for it 
served as a basis for a number of initiatives and activities on 
behalf of the Community. The approach suggested to Member 
States centred around four regulatory mechanisms: 1) the 
establishment of a Community-wide accident surveillance 
system; 2) the imposition of a general duty of safety on 
manufacturers and dealers; 3) the development of appropriate 




























































































markets; 4) the imposition of strict liability for defective 
products on manufacturers, dealers and importers.
A step forward was made with the Single European Act: 
Art. 100A, para. 3 EEC explicitly recognizes consumer pro­
tection as a Community policy. This provision suffers however 
from two defects: first, it constrains consumer protection with­
in the scope of Community activities geared to the com-pletion 
of the internal market; second, the legal provisions are ad­
dressed specifically to the Commission alone, and not to the 
Community as a whole. More significantly, the Single European 
Act has not changed the distribution of competence between 
Member States and the Community in the area of consumer 
protection: safety remains the responsibility of Member States 
so long as they do not decide to transfer the regulatory power to 
the Community institutions.
In spite of these limitations in primary Community law, 
and although a 1989 draft directive, concerning general product 
safety, will probably meet with strong opposition from some 
Member States, an important factor should not be overlooked: 
over the years a number of special directives have been 
adopted, which are graded according to the hazard potential, in 
such areas as medicines, pesticides, chemicals and other 
consumer goods. This body of secondary Community legislation 
means that the regulatory competence formerly held by States 
under Art. 36 is in the process of gradually shifting towards the 
Community.
Can we be content with these new policies and this new 
legislation of the Community? It is suggested that they are 
inadequate and insufficient. One of the major drawbacks of the 
present state of affairs regards the judicial remedies available to 
consumers. At present, individuals and consumer organizations 
can bring an action under Article 175 against Community 
institutions for omitting to act or even for insufficient action; 
this right, however, is subject to the condition that the claimants 
should have legal standing, that is,that they should show a direct 
and individual concern. No class action is provided for. In other 
words, only those who are directly and individually threatened 




























































































among other things that standing can exist in the field of 
‘process regulation’ while it can be absent in the field of 
‘product regulation’: decisions on the installation of an 
enterprise always concern a limited number of consumers, 
namely those who live near the plant. By contrast, risks resulting 
from unsafe products concern the whole mass of European 
consumers, who however lack standing until such time as they 
are directly and individually threatened.
To improve upon the present condition, administrative 
powers in the area of consumers rights ought to be delegated by 
Member States to the Community. In addition, it would be 
appropriate to grant consumers and consumer groups broader 
rights of remedial action.
Let us take a close look at the changes which could usefully 
be introduced in this area.
The following set of normative measures seem advisable.
First, the right to safety should be laid down in the Treaty 
of Rome itself. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to give a 
definition of such a right. Rather, it should be formulated in 
loose terms, as a general clause setting out requirements 
concerning the safety of installations and products, graded 
according to risks. In addition, it should grant a broad 
discretionary power to the Community to take appropriate 
action graded according to the risks concerned.
Second, although regulatory powers, i.e. the power to 
issue regulations on product safety throughout the Community, 
can be transferred to private standard-setting institutions, so as 
to integrate expert knowledge in the process designed to define 
the level of safety protection. There is however an area where 
the Community should instead retain regulatory powers: this is 
the area of hazardous products, where control could be 
effected, according to the degree of potential risk, through 





























































































Third, where regulatory powers are transferred to private 
bodies, public interests should however be safeguarded by the 
Community institutions, which should retain the power: 1) to 
influence the private standard-setting procedure (this might also 
include the necessity of providing for procedures for prior 
administrative approval or prior registration for certain 
products); 2) to impose on the private entities the duty to open 
up the standard-setting procedure to public interest groups; 3) 
to guarantee consistent mechanisms of post-market control in 
order to facilitate the taking of corrective action, if need be.
Fourth, in addition to participating in the standard-setting 
procedure, citizens should be granted the right to participate in 
all product control procedures, irrespective of the particular 
regulatory technique employed.
Fifth, all consumers and consumer organizations should be 
given the right to take action before the European Court of 
Justice for the Commission’s failure to act or for insufficient 
action. In other words, the legal requirement that only those 
who can show a direct and individual concern have a legal 
standing, should be abolished by amending Art. 173 of the 
Treaty of Rome. In addition, the role of the European Parliament 
as a consumer watch-dog should be enhanced by granting the 
Parliament the right to sue the Council for inaction in the area of 
consumer rights (this measure too would, of course, require 
amendment of Art.173).
(4) Educational/cultural rights
Political and legal constraints
There is some political resistance to Community action in this 
sphere. In particular the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany have voiced their trenchant 
opposition to certain Community moves. This is not due to a 
determination to resist the advancing tides of Community 
expansion at all costs, but is partially linked to extraneous 
factors. For example the Lander in the Federal Republic of 
Germany are reluctant to see their special competence for 




























































































and the United Kingdom have special linguistic and cultural links 
outside the Community which would be threatened by serious 
moves towards ‘Community Culture’. However whether the 
Community takes specific action or not in this field, the creation 
of a single market will offer numerous increased opportunities 
in the educational and cultural fields. In order that these 




The Commission’s proposal for a directive granting a right for 
Community students to enter other Member States and take up 
residence should be implemented. Furthermore, one can 
foresee the possibility of other measures designed to increase 
educational mobility being legally justified as necessary for 
ensuring the genuine free movement of workers. Clearly, real 
mobility for workers will be dependent on frontier-free 
opportunities for training and qualifying. As regards other 
obstacles to mobility attention should be focussed on the 
academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study so that 
Community students will eventually enjoy an enforceable right 
to study or train abroad.
(b) Equal treatment
Two classes of Community citizens
Due to the present legal framework there is discrimination in 
the field of education between: Community workers and all the 
members of their family, and other Community nationals in the 
field of education. This second category includes Community 
students who enjoy fewer rights than those in the first group. 
Whereas the first group are guaranteed equal treatment with 
nationals, Community students are guaranteed only equal access 
to the limited sphere of vocational training as defined by the 
Court of Justice. This hardly seems justified in the context of ‘A 
People’s Europe’. However, it is not difficult to see why 




























































































systems to every qualified Community student who wants to 
come: firstly, students would quickly gravitate to the most 
generous Member State and so overburden the limited 
educational resources available, and secondly foreign students 
might be perceived as ‘free riders’ who pay no contribution in 
taxes and take their skills away with them when their study 
period is over. One solution would be a scheme similar to that 
which already exists for allocating the financial burdens of 
medical care in the Community.
Equal Treatment of Non-Community Nationals
There is considerable discrimination against non-Community 
nationals in the sphere of education. This is so even where they 
are permanently resident. In other federal systems such as 
Canada and the United States it is unconstitutional to deny 
financial assistance in this field to lawfully resident aliens. Even 
though these countries can be distinguished, as the federal 
power is responsible for the admission of aliens, international 
human rights instruments often outlaw discrimination between 
nationals and aliens in the field of education. From a human 
rights perspective it would seem desirable to alleviate some of 
this discrimination.
A cultural rights policy
Some of the greatest opportunities for cultural workers may 
undoubtedly result from the full implementation of Community 
freedoms concerning free movement, freedom of 
establishment, and freedom to provide services. However, it is 
exactly this development which threatens individual cultural 
rights: not only will some cultural workers be subjected to new 
competition from abroad, but those Member States which 
currently offer a high level of subsidy may be less enthusiastic 
about financing culture when the artists and their creations are 
‘foreign’. This could lead to a reduction in funds available for the 
preservation or promotion of culture. Solutions might include 
the following: first, the permissible limitations to Community 
freedoms (such as those found in Articles 36 and 56 of the 
Treaty of Rome) might be interpreted so that the protection of 




























































































first step a trilateral Declaration by the Community institutions is 
suggested). Second, Community competence could be given a 
firmer legal foundation. This could be done by means of a 
separate Treaty (which might provide for non-Community 
states to become parties).
(5) Rights vis-à-vis the public administration
It is common knowledge that the public administration of 
modern States has been increasingly expanding. In particular, it 
has broadened its activity from the traditional task of 
safeguarding law and order to that of providing services and 
various forms of assistance to citizens. In addition, 
intergovernmental administrations have been set up, which 
directly or indirectly affect the lives of individuals; in this respect 
the impact of supranational authorities existing in Western 
Europe, i.e., the Community institutions, is an extreme and 
glaring example of the way non-State bodies can impinge upon 
the daily life of individuals and enterprises.
These developments have rendered it imperative that 
those who are or may be affected by administrative decisions 
(either as their addressees or as third parties who may be 
affected by those decisions, e.g. competitors of an enterprise 
which has been granted a public subsidy) do not become the 
object and ‘victims’ of this process. To put it differently, the 
administrative process should be ‘transparent’: the individual 
should be enabled to look into it, and, if need be, to set forth his 
or her demands and be enabled to challenge administrative acts.
To meet these needs, individuals should be granted three 
basic rights: 1) the right to information about the relevant 
regulations and decisions (including the right of access to 
administrative records, the right to be informed about the 
reasons behind the administrative act and the remedies available 
against it); 2) the right to be heard before a decision is taken, 
whenever it is unfavourable to the individual or adversely affects 
his or her rights or interests; 3) the right to a legal remedy.
In Western Europe, the problem of respect for these 




























































































administrations, and vis-à-vis acts adopted by Community 
institutions.
As far as the first level is concerned, European States have 
all endeavoured to grant individuals the aforementioned rights. 
However, gaps and differences exist, in particular in the areas of 
access to public records and judicial and other remedies vis-à-vis 
the acts of the public authorities.
In view of these differences and the resulting uneven 
protection of the individual, the role of the Community could 
consist in attempting to promote the harmonization of some 
general principles. To this end, it would be advisable to work 
out a general text (in the form of a resolution or a 
recommendation by one of the Community institutions, 
possibly the Parliament) setting out a series of principles (e.g. 
concerning the codification of rules regarding the 
administration, the compilation of case-law, the elaboration of 
practical guide-books; in the case of general administrative acts 
or regulations, the principle of consultation by public 
authorities of those who might be directly concerned should be 
proclaimed, as well as that of publicizing the preparatory work 
before the adoption of the acts; other principles should deal 
with the end of the anonymity of civil servants performing 
administrative acts; the setting up of non-judicial, as well as 
judicial remedies against administrative acts, etc.)
If we now turn to the second level, namely that of 
Community institutions, it is easy to realize that by and large the 
three rights at issue are well respected by those institutions. 
Indeed, at the Community level a proper balance has been 
struck between the requirements of efficient administration and 
the interest of all those affected by Community decisions in 
enjoying a host of procedural rights. Community developments 
that have taken place in this area at the Community level reflect 
such a careful and well-balanced consideration of conflicting 
needs, that they have started gradually to trickle down into 
national administrative systems. Gaps and deficiencies can 
however be discerned in this luminous picture. Thus, for 
instance, as far as the right to information is concerned, 




























































































the right to be heard, lacunae can be pinpointed in three areas: 
first, the procedural rights of the individual are not codified; 
secondly, the right to inspection of files suffers from glaring 
exceptions; third, no specification has been made so far of 
which third parties are entitled to procedural rights vis-à-vis an 
administrative decision directly affecting other people. A few 
minor gaps can also be discerned in the right to a legal remedy.
Improvements of the existing situation should not be 
difficult. At the normative level, one might suggest that the right 
to information and the right to be heard should be entrenched 
in a ‘Declaration of basic human rights’. In addition, details 
concerning the technicalities of these rights might be laid down 
in a ‘Regulation on administrative procedures’.
B. The challenge posed by new technologies
(1) Medical ethics, genetics and related matters
(a) Questions of genetics and freedom of information
Advances in our understanding of our genetic and medical make 
up, coupled with advances in information technology pose a 
number of questions, particularly in the context of the internal 
market after 1992. Should personal genetic information become 
available to employers and insurers, those who are most 
vulnerable and therefore most need employment and insurance, 
may find themselves unfairly excluded from the market in the 
name of efficiency and actuarial accounting. If the Community 
were to introduce Community-wide rules based on the Member 
State which allows maximum freedom -  we have to ask: whose 
freedom? That of the insurers or that of the job seeker, 
consumer, worker?
In a Community of pan-European insurance companies 
this is an area where supranational initiatives should lead the way. 
On the other hand, these scientific developments also offer 
enormous life saving opportunities: the knowledge that an 
airplane pilot will suddenly be struck with the genetically 




























































































nervous and muscular system into violent spasms) could save 
hundreds of lives. Similarly, the availability of computerized 
information on citizens’ blood groups, allergies, sensitivity to 
anaesthetics, medical records, DNA fingerprints etc. could be 
vital in emergency situations. In an era of free movement of 
workers and mass tourism these questions demand more than 
mere co-operation between sovereign states. Supranational co­
ordination is clearly essential; however, such action should go 
beyond removing barriers to free trade. Who should know, and 
who should not know, this sort of information has to be 
governed not by market forces, but by carefully thought out 
policy. The use of 20th Century technology can not always be 
regulated by 19th Century economics. Similar problems are 
already emerging as AIDS sufferers and séropositives are 
discriminated against and marginalized.
(b) Reproduction technology and freedom of information
Moving to questions of reproduction technology we again find 
some of the problems posed in terms of rights to information: 
the parents’ right to know the sex, colour, ability or disability of 
children before they are born. And similarly the rights of 
children to information about their biological origins. Due to 
advances made in the various projects concerned with mapping 
the human genome, it will be possible to increase our 
knowledge about genetic predisposition to certain diseases. 
Again it is suggested that these questions are linked to the 
market and more particularly to the insurance market. Some 
people are concerned to safeguard parents’ right to decide to go 
ahead and have handicapped children. As more information on 
future generations becomes available there may be some 
pressure either from the welfare state or from private actors not 
to bring such financial burdens into the world.
(c) The commercialization of the body
Other advances relate to artificial insemination, surrogacy, 
embryo experimentation and organ donation. Here one can 
discern a tendency to prohibit by law the ‘commercialization’ of 
these sectors. Alongside these developments is a changing 




























































































and reproduction, and the norm of having a mother and a 
father. When the new reproductive possibilities are viewed as 
more than therapeutic aids but as offering to women more 
reproductive choice, it seems inappropriate to prohibit certain 
forms of family life for those who are forced to have recourse to 
alternative forms of reproduction when others remain free to 
adopt different combinations once they have ‘naturally acquired’ 
the child. Attempts to control the suitability (in non medical 
terms) of a prospective family where artificial reproduction is 
contemplated would seem to be an unjustifiable intrusion on 
privacy with sinister overtones of eugenics. It is particularly 
inappropriate that such ‘judgments’ should be entrusted to 
doctors, who are ill-equipped to take such decisions.
Questions concerning surrogacy have been decided on the 
grounds of privacy and equal protection in the United States. In 
the Baby M case, Judge Sorkow pointed out that men were free 
to offer sperm and that similarly women should not be denied 
the freedom to reproduce. However, this logic was not followed 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court which stated that one can not 
permit the conversion of the body into a commercial 
commodity.
These two visions of human dignity constantly conflict 
Whilst some want to outlaw reproductive technology, genetic 
engineering, and embryo experimentation on the grounds that 
it threatens health and dignity, others demand freedom to 
research, freedom to decide about their own body, and 
freedom to contribute to the health and dignity of future 
generations. This tension is particularly difficult to resolve as 
both sides are invoking the same values.
Concern about embryo experimentation raises the 
question of the status of the ‘embryo’. What is striking is the 
ease with which embryos can be manufactured and preserved, 
however the fact remains that embryo research could lead to a 
reduction in human suffering in the long run. The European 
Parliamentary Resolution on ethical and legal problems of 
genetic engineering (16 March 1989) ‘considers it should be a 
criminal offence to keep human embryos alive artificially with a 




























































































Resolution suggests a number of other criminal prohibitions in 
the field of embryo research and cryopreservation as well as in 
the fields discussed briefly above: genome analysis, somatic 
gene therapy, and genetic manipulation of the germ line.
As far as the child itself is concerned it is important not to 
forget the right not to know too much about oneself so that one 
may discover one’s own unique identity oneself. However, 
limited information about one’s biological origins which 
preserves the anonymity of the donor should be available.
Law can not hope to keep up with technical advances in 
this field, and should not attempt to legislate for future 
hypothetical situations. Furthermore attempts to legislate in this 
field can only threaten pluralism in a particularly authoritarian 
way.
Some of the following principles already enjoy a good deal 
of consensus and could be evolved into a Declaration.
(0 Women have a special right to the protection of their 
health and safety in the field of artificial reproduction.
(ii) Personal genetic information should be confidential 
and one should enjoy a right not to be discriminated against on 
the grounds of one’s genetic constitution.
(iii) The right to an identity, including the rights of future 
generations and the right to be different could be developed.
(iv) The right to know one’s biological origins (with 
limitations so that one retains the right to develop) should be 
examined. (This should not be limited only to those who are the 
products of artificial reproduction as this would lead to 
undesirable discrimination and stigmatization.)
(v) The right to reproduce (with limitations relating to the 
rights of others and the prohibition on commercialization) 
could be enshrined. Safeguards should relate to the obligation to 




























































































(vi) The right to control one’s own body includes not only 
the right not to fall ill and the right to be treated, but also the 
right to die with dignity.
Community action in this field could involve a 
combination of three techniques:
-  The setting up of international commissions of evaluation and 
control.
-  Community provisions either in the form of supranational 
legislation or harmonization.
-  The elaboration, in cooperation with the Council of Europe, of 
a new European Convention on Genetics, or additional 
Protocols to the European Convention on Human Rights.
(2) Freedom of information
Moving away from the medical field and onto freedom of 
information in general, freedom of information is now 
considered from two aspects at the Community level. Firstly, it 
is considered as an essential element for ensuring democratic 
pluralism without which there is no real freedom of 
information; and secondly information itself is considered a 
good, and the provision of information, a service, so that the 
free flow of information throughout the Community is an 
economic activity and must be protected as such. Today the 
movement of information across frontiers is usually difficult to 
detect. Electronic media cannot be subjected to customs 
controls, so where this information can be legitimately 
restricted (in accordance with Article 10(2) ECHR), new 
frameworks for monitoring and control will have to be devised.
Information and the capacity to use and understand it are 
essential elements in the formation of a European citizenship. 
However, advances in this field will have to take into 
consideration the cultural diversity which makes up Europe. 
Technical progress and harmonizing measures are rightly 
perceived as a threat to multifarious sources of information and 
the preservation of pluralism. The best protection may ensue 
from ensuring plurality both of different medias and of actors 




























































































Some of the restrictions on broadcasting found in the new 
Council of Europe Convention on Transfrontier Television have 
been denounced as restrictions on economic freedom. 
However, the restrictions have a legitimate goal and the 
additional rights found in the Convention (such as the duty on 
broadcasters to present news fairly) could usefully complement 
the Community Directive on television broadcasting. It is 
suggested that the Community and the Member States all 
become parties to the Council of Europe Convention on 
Transfrontier Television. Such a move would both stress the 
Community’s commitment to a common cultural identity in 
Europe and also avoid a possible divergence between the 
Community regulation of television and the Council of Europe 
system. Such a risk is all the more apparent while the 
Community legal order contains no right to expression 
equivalent to Article 10 ECHR.
The protection of a European audio-visual industry (and 
therefore European ‘culture’) raises very difficult questions. A 
vaguely worded formula which allows broadcasters to put out 
their Euro-quota at three o’clock in the morning will hardly 
serve the objective of pluralism in Europe. It is quite clear that 
American and Japanese production companies would quickly 
take over or merge with European producers if this was the only 
way into the European market. On the other hand a rigid quota 
system could sap incentive, deny consumer choice, and result in 
European co-productions with no ‘cultural’ content merely 
comprising of a hotch-potch of languages, locations, and story 
lines. In legal terms, a quota system can be justified by the 
constitutional principle that the authorities have to safeguard 
freedom of expression and access to broadcasting to a variety of 
broadcasters representing different social currents and 
opinions. In finding a solution to the protection of pluralism, 
particular attention should be paid to the subject of media 
concentrations and problems concerning exclusive access to 
events of public interest. Furthermore, it is suggested that some 
harmonisation be attempted concerning tax regimes and 
national systems of state subsidies. Special consideration will 
have to be given to the legitimacy of state aids in this area as one 




























































































fundamental human rights and the protection of pluralism in 
Europe.
Another development worth noting is the phenomenon 
of ‘electronic or living-room democracy’. In other words the 
possibility of instant opinion polls/referenda which will 
influence governmental action. Clearly there are several 
advantages of representative democracy: active participation by 
citizens, and the constant reformulation and elaboration of the 
most suitable solutions for the long term, rather than popular 
partisan immediate satisfaction; and it is suggested that questions 
concerning the make-up of electronic (or other) opinion polls 
should be studied by the Community in cooperation with the 
Council of Europe.
(3) Data protection versus the right to privacy
It was stressed above that technological progress can have 
adverse consequences for the freedom of individuals in the area 
of data processing. The staggering resort to computer science 
for the collection of data concerning the personal life, career 
and other information about individuals might easily result in 
grave encroachments on their privacy. How then to reconcile 
two seemingly conflicting needs: freedom to impart and receive 
information, and respect for the private life of individuals?
Fortunately, Member States have become aware of such 
perils and have passed legislation on the matter. A comparative 
survey of national and international legislation shows that a set of 
principles have emerged designed to reconcile the 
aforementioned conflicting needs. These include: the principle 
of limited collection of data (whereby the unlawful or unfair 
collection of personal data is prohibited); the principle of the 
‘quality of data’ (on the strength of which, data must be adequate, 
accurate and up-to-date, besides being relevant to the purposes 
for which they are stored); the principle whereby the goal of 
data collection must be specified; the principle limiting the use 
of data, so that dissemination of data or interconnection of files 
is made conditional on the consent of the persons concerned or 
in accordance with the existence of a specific legislative 





























































































data; the principle of transparence (whereby information about 
the existence of files, their purpose and use are to be made 
public); the principle of individual participation (by virtue of 
which the individuals concerned should have access to files, a 
right to rectification and to the erasing of data), and finally the 
principle of responsibility, establishing the personal 
responsibility of those in charge of files.
On close scrutiny, it appears however that there are 
differences between the various national laws in many areas: for 
instance, they differ in scope, or provide different definitions, 
and while some laws are general in character, those of other 
States only cover specific areas.
Great importance therefore accrues to the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, of 1981. This 
Convention exhaustively covers all the major problems arising 
in this area and can be safely taken as a model set of international 
standards in the area.
By contrast, little has been accomplished in the 
Community, except for a number of important resolutions of 
the European Parliament. It therefore seems advisable for the 
Community to take some form of action, in view of the specific 
relevance that this matter has within the Community.
As far as the merits of the prospective Community action 
are concerned, it would be advisable to avoid elaborating new 
instruments, and instead to take up the standards already 
worked out within the Council of Europe.
On the operational level, it might prove useful to adopt a 
directive calling upon Member States to establish a legal regime 
for the protection of personal data and to this end to 
implement the principles laid down in the Council of Europe 
Convention. Any Community provision should include 
provisions which go beyond the Convention and take account 
of the developments which have taken place in the last ten 
years. Most importantly, it is worth noting that most provisions 




























































































mainframe computer and ‘data manager’ in mind. Today, data 
can be lost by dropping a personal computer, and information 
can be stolen through the telephone lines, or by pocketing a 
floppy disc or even by radiation detection apparatus outside the 
data-centre building.
(4) The promotion of freedom of information in the 
Community
Freedom of information has several general implications in the 
Community. First, a lot of information which could be of use to 
the individual is currently either not available or difficult to 
obtain. Information for Community citizens concerning the 
side-effects of drugs, toxicity of pesticides in use in the garden, 
food additives, etc is either not available or difficult to obtain. In 
a frontier-free single market, the Community will have to take 
some responsibility for ensuring that this vital information 
becomes more accessible.
Second, accessibility to electronic information is seriously 
hindered by the lack of European networks. There is no 
equivalent to the effective American ARPANET system, and 
those links which do exist demand a good deal of ingenuity, 
effort and money. It is essential for real freedom of information 
that European networks exist which allow for easy connections 
to host computers at a cost which is not exorbitant and does not 
vary widely between the Member States. This is a further 
example of the regulation of the internal market offering 
enhanced opportunities for the protection of fundamental 
freedoms, in this case freedom of information. Of course, such 
networks must be subjected to controls necessary for the 
protection of personal information.
C. Areas which require special measures 
(1) Women
(a) Introduction:
It may appear strange that women are included as a special 




























































































However as was suggested in the introductory section on ‘the 
gender perspective’, this is due to the fact that an approach 
which concentrates on formal equality before the law is 
incapable of addressing every field where women suffer lack of 
opportunity and violations of their dignity.
Laws which guarantee equal rights, mean laws which offer 
women those rights which men already have. This is not enough. 
What is more important is to resolve situations where gender is 
the source of the violation. In other words, it is not enough just 
to outlaw and punish discrimination which makes it impossible 
or more difficult for women to take up certain activities already 
undertaken by men; what is needed is an approach which takes 
account of existing inequalities which result in women enjoying 
no equality of opportunity or equality in fact.
There are many examples of gender operating as a source 
of a violation rather than as a condition of discrimination, sexual 
harassment at work, domestic violence, sexual attacks, and mass 
produced images of women which commercialize and 
propagate their domesticity and sexuality.
However, in taking this approach we are faced with a 
fundamental tension: in stressing the differences rather than the 
equality between women and men we obviously hinder an 
integrated non-discriminatory resolution of the problems 
surrounding equal opportunity. Nevertheless it is suggested that, 
faced as we are, with the results of systematic discrimination and 
unequal treatment, the way forward is to recognize that women 
are faced with different obstacles and threats to their dignity. 
Therefore, until we reach real equality, measures such as positive 
action and quotas which perpetrate gender as a condition of 
discrimination are an unfortunate necessity.
(b) Individual rights to equal treatment and respect for dignity
The report on the ‘rights of women’ suggests individualized 
segmented rights which derive from the fundamental 
overarching principles of the ‘right to equal treatment’ and the 
‘right to respect for one’s dignity’. These detailed rights avoid 




























































































general principles. The suggestions related to equal treatment 
cover political rights to participate, vote and stand for election 
at all levels of public and political activity; rights which ensure 
equal conditions in civil life such as the right to keep one’s name 
after marriage and to hand it on to one’s children; the right to 
structural support concerning pregnancy and child care; rights 
within the family to equal authority over their children and 
possessions; the right to a non-sexist education; the right to 
equal access to every profession; and the right to the elimination 
of conditions which discriminate (directly or indirectly) against 
women as regards eligibility for social security and other 
benefits.
Turning to rights derived from ‘the right of women to 
respect for their dignity’ one might include the following 
suggestions: rights concerning the images which commercialize 
women’s domestic or sexual dimension; rights which ensure the 
protection of dignity as regards the body; rights which ensure 
dignity at work, in particular, to counter sexual harassment; and 
rights for migrant women to be treated with dignity in the host 
country without prejudice arising from race, social origin or 
economic means.
(c) Difficulties concerning methods of protection
All the problems concerning judicial protection are particularly 
relevant in this field. Not only are there problems of standing 
and limitation periods but the financial implications of a 
judgment may mean that its retroactive effect is tempered or 
even that provisions are interpreted restrictively. This is 
particularly evident at the supranational level as the effects of any 
judgment will be felt beyond the actual parties to the case. In the 
end financial compensation after the event will not always be the 
best way to ensure equality for women. Preventive measures 
which eliminate and discourage discriminatory practices before 
they take effect should be examined. Of particular interest is the 
work of bodies such as the Equal Opportunities Commission in 
the United Kingdom. Other responses to the inefficacy of 
judicial protection should include Community criteria for 
defining indirect discrimination and attributing the burden of 




























































































with provisions for legal aid etc. so that the hurdles which 
prevent access to justice can be more easily tackled.
In the move towards equality in reality rather than in law it 
is important to deal with, and distinguish, four factors which 
recognize the difference between men and women. Firstly, the 
physiological condition of women in the context of maternity 
means a differentiated approach is needed both as regards the 
family and working conditions during and after pregnancy. 
Secondly, physical characteristics such as height, weight, 
strength may be objectively considered for some types of 
work. Thirdly, some types of work are classed as heavy, dirty, or 
dangerous; this should not facilitate justifying higher wages for 
men. Such classifications should be carefully examined to ensure 
that they are actually necessary for the work to be performed. 
Fourthly, legal solutions which are aimed at compensating 
women in the move towards equality, (such as positive action, 
the attribution of the burden of proof, and measures which 
ensure protection of dignity) are justifiable egalitarian measures 
which should not be ‘levelled down’ in the name of according 
men and women ‘equal rights’.
Regarding the legitimacy of positive action, Article 4 of the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979) contains a principle of 
interpretation which not only legitimizes positive action but also 
demands such action in the move towards equality. This 
principle is part of the domestic legal order of those states 
which have ratified the Convention. (All EC Member States 
except Luxembourg and the Netherlands).
(d) Community competence
Article 119 is exceptional among the Community freedoms in 
that it guarantees men and women equal pay for equal work 
regardless of their nationality or the lack of a transnational 
dimension. However in order to tackle sexual equality in a larger 





























































































Family policy could be developed so that the various 
initiatives already undertaken by the Commission are developed 
in a more energetic and coherent way. The Commission has 
drawn attention to the differences in Member States’ legislation 
in the following fields: adoption, custody, access, and 
maintenance rights following separation or divorce, legislation 
concerning nationality and residence. Furthermore we should 
add procedural variables which operate differently in the 
Member States: the burden of proof, the applicable sanctions, 
and the effect of foreign judgments. The substantive and 
procedural differences across the Community are particularly 
relevant for the protection of the fundamental rights of women. 
Although harmonization is not necessarily a solution, some 
further coordination is necessary if the action taken so far 
concerning the social dimension is to become truly effective. 
One way to do this would be for the Community to encourage 
Member States to ratify various international instruments in this 
field.
Migrant women (both Community and non-Community 
nationals) are particularly affected by incongruities in the 
legislation in these matters. Furthermore, they have special 
demands which should be recognized as rights: equal conditions 
at work; housing according to the needs of their family, 
education and training in the language of the host country; 
vocational training; health and maternity care; social and cultural 
links with their country of origin. At the moment, migrant 
women are still frequently in a precarious legal position 
concerning matters such as residence, access to work and 
education. These and other matters such as the limited facilities 
for child care are not covered by Article 119 and the directives 
on equality. In addition, migrant women from non-Community 
countries suffer from social and economic marginalization, often 
ending up on the fringes of the economy with no social 
protection.
(e) Possible developments
(0 An autonomous right for women to respect for their dignity 




























































































sectors: eg sexual harassment at work, health and safety, criminal 
law etc.
(ii) Community competence should cover a) family policy b) 
migration policy c) the division of family responsibility and 
structural support concerning child care.
(iii) The European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
of Judgments could be developed so as to include matters 
relating to family law which are presently excluded.
(iv) Preventative measures which sensitize certain sectors to the 
needs and rights of women should be encouraged. Examples 
include inspectorates and Equal Opportunities Commissions.
(v) The reversal of the burden of proof so as to favour women 
bringing a claim concerning discrimination should be 
supported at the Community level.
(2) Children
A class of persons who are very much in need of special 
protection is children. So far they have been taken into account 
by Community institutions from a specific point of view only, 
namely that of Labour: action in favour of children has been 
taken in the field of free movement of migrant workers, of 
vocational training as well as in a related and consequential area, 
that of education.
It has however been suggested that concern with children 
should extend to other areas, unrelated to labour: that of access 
to justice, health, the right to adequate information, protection 
against abuse and maltreatment, and that of nationality. To rebut 
the possible objection that these areas are outside the 
Community’s terms of reference, it has been contended that ‘on 
account of the principle of non-discrimination and in view of 
the Commission’s tasks concerning free movement of persons, 
one ought not to demand that a specific competence at the 
Community level be established, for the Community to protect 




























































































Even those who may disagree with this contention should 
take account of the following factors. First, the increasing 
integration brought about by the Common Market, especially in 
the perspective of 1992, will bring the problems of children 
more into focus. Greater circulation within the Community gives 
rise to problems of uprooting, adjustment to foreign habits, 
learning foreign languages, to the establishment of mixed 
couples (i.e. couples consisting of persons having different 
nationalities), information about the social, political system of 
the new country, etc. In many respects children are doomed to 
suffer much more than their parents from these social 
phenomena. It would be inappropriate for the Community to 
remain blind to these problems, since to a great extent they are 
closely connected, or even consequential upon, the integration 
promoted by the Common Market.
The second factor is not related to greater freedom of 
movement of persons within the Twelve, but to current social 
conditions. It stands to reasons that at present children are 
much more than before exposed to social violence, to all sorts 
of abuse, and are particularly prone to fall victim of drugs, 
alcohol and even AIDS. All this follows from increasing 
urbanization, from the disruption of family life and many other 
similar social phenomena that are there for everyone to see. 
Again, it would not be advisable for the Community to remain 
oblivious of all these social factors: the human dimension of the 
four freedoms proclaimed in the Treaty of Rome cannot be 
brushed under the carpet by simply stating that the Community 
can only act in the field of economic and labour relations.
A third factor that should not be underrated is the need to 
take account of the effect on children of a host of problems 
arising out of the emergence of new technology, particularly in 
the area of natural reproduction. It follows that new rights are 
now proclaimed with which the Community institutions may 
have to deal: the right of the child to know his or her biological 
origin, in particular the right to be informed about possible 





























































































That the Community has not remained deaf to the special 
needs of children is proved by the fact that the Community 
institutions, in particular the Commission and the Parliament, 
have dealt with a set of problems going beyond those strictly 
relating to labour and vocational training. This action should 
however be expanded and strengthened. On the normative 
level, it would be appropriate for Community institutions to 
prompt the Member States to ratify the existing or new 
Conventions, in particular the U.N. Convention on the rights of 
children.
(3) The nationals of third Sates
It would preposterous to aim at creating in the Community a 
sort of paradise -  as far as human rights are concerned -  for 
Community nationals, while totally neglecting the condition of 
all those, who possessing the nationality of third States or being 
stateless, find themselves in the Community territory for 
reasons other than tourism. Human rights are by definition 
universal. One of the basic principles protecting human dignity 
is the principle of non discrimination, which is designed to 
abolish barriers and invidious distinctions between individuals. 
It would therefore be contrary to the very essence of the 
doctrine of human rights to disregard people coming from 
third States and residing on the territory of one of the Twelve.
Lofty principles have however to face the harsh reality of 
economic and social conditions. Adjustments to and 
attenuations of the strict demands of the human rights doctrine 
are therefore called for.
Let us start by saying that the problem arises not only with 
regard to migrant workers, but also with respect to their family 
dependents, as well as refugees, stateless persons and asylum 
seekers. For the sake of brevity we shall concentrate here on the 
largest class, namely migrant workers.
Here, we must distinguish between those who reside or 
have resided in one of the Twelve for short periods, and those 
who have established themselves permanently in one of those 




























































































five years. Both classes of people of course enjoy the basic 
rights and freedoms provided for in the European Convention 
of Human Rights and its Protocols. These instruments, however, 
do not regulate the entry, the length of residence or the working 
conditions of aliens. We are therefore obliged to fall back on the 
national legislation of each of the Twelve as well as Community 
legislation, if any.
A survey of this body of law makes it advisable to 
concentrate on those belonging to the second of the above 
mentioned-classes, for it is only with regard to them that 
national and supranational legislation is likely to grant rights 
assimilating aliens from third States to EC nationals.
What then is the present legal situation of these 
individuals? Four main points must be made.
First, there exist wide differences among the Twelve as far 
as national legislation on the treatment of aliens is concerned. 
Differences concern admission, the granting of a residence or 
work permit, the granting of specific rights relating to working 
activities, and expulsion. The major common feature of this 
legislation is that it markedly differentiates the position of non- 
EC migrant workers from that of the nationals of each receiving 
EC Member State.
Second, the labour market situation constitutes the 
decisive criterion used by national authorities when deciding on 
whether to issue a residence permit and for how long.
Third, Member States are allowed to discriminate on the 
basis of nationality between their own nationals and third States’ 
nationals (or between other EC nationals and third States’ 
nationals) in the field of entry, residence and access to work. For 
these discriminatory measures to be lawful, they must be 
authorized by national legislation. To put it differently, EC 
legislation does not prohibit the aforementioned discrimination, 
where it is laid down in national legislation.
Fourth, even those aliens from third countries who have 




























































































years have no right to move freely within the Community 
territory.
What has been done so far at the Community level to cater 
for the needs of alien migrant workers?
Apart from a few resolutions of the European Parliament 
and a Decision of the Commission (adopted in 1985 and revised 
in 1988), mention should be made of the Regulation adopted by 
the Council in 1968 (no. 1612/68 and revised in 1976 (Reg. no. 
312/76). While reaffirming that Member States are not 
prevented from discriminating between EC nationals and aliens 
coming from third States, the Regulation accords a privileged 
position to those family dependents of EC nationals, who have 
the nationality of a third State (according to Art. 11 the spouse 
and children have the right to accept any form of wage-earning 
employment on the territory of a Member State, even if they do 
not have the nationality of any of the EC Member States).
In addition, some agreements entered into by the 
Community with third States (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, 
Yugoslavia) provide that EC Member States will not discriminate 
against the nationals of these countries with respect to 
conditions of employment and remuneration. Under an 
agreement with Turkey the Parties agree to gradually attain the 
free movement of migrant workers and the prevention of any 
form of discrimination.
All this no doubt is very little compared to the magnitude 
of the problem. If however so little has been achieved hitherto, 
this is accounted for by the pressing demands of national 
workers who, faced with growing unemployment, exact greater 
protection for themselves especially in view of the impending 
dismantling of the last barriers to free movement of EC 
nationals.
It would, however, be naïve to believe that by simply 
erecting or strengthening barriers, the growing influx of foreign 
workers both from Third World and Eastern European 
countries will be stopped. To pursue such a policy can merely 




























































































ruthlessly exploited as cheap and unprotected labour; besides, 
this policy may also gradually lead to an increase in racism, crime 
and degrading treatment.
The better way out should consist of elaborating a policy 
designed to tackle the problem at its root, both abroad and 
within the Community territory. As for the ‘External policy’, it 
would be advisable to work out a better development policy 
concerning the Third World countries from where the flux of 
immigrants is greatest. The aim, plainly, should be to help create 
the economic and social conditions in third States so that there 
would be less desire to emmigrate. By the same token, and with 
regard to Eastern European countries, a more active policy in 
the field of human rights with a view to improving the human 
rights record there, together with economic assistance, might 
prove helpful in diminishing the demand for expatriation.
So much for the ‘outside’ action. As for the action to be 
taken on the Community territory, a long-term objective should 
be pursued: to put those aliens from third countries, who are 
lawful permanent residents in one of the Twelve, on the same 
footing as EC nationals, by (a) granting them equal treatment 
with the nationals of the country of residence at least in a 
number of areas and (b) full freedom of movement within the 
territory of the Community.
Until such time as these objectives are attained, some 
interim measures ought to be taken as intermediate steps. In 
particular, one may mention the granting of voting rights in local 
elections, the establishment of schooling programmes and 
vocational training for young immigrants, as well as the setting 
up of an EC bureau for combating racial discrimination.
Of course, even assuming that the political will for the 
achievement of the above ambitious objectives can be 
mustered, the plight of new immigrants, or of those who cannot 
yet be regarded yet as permanent residents, will continue to 
pose huge problems for each and every Member State of the 
EC. So long as no common policy is devised and carried out in 
this area, each Member State will have to come to grips with a 




























































































D. Is Community citizenship a means of enhancing 
human rights?
There is much talk of a Community Citizenship, European 
citizens, ‘L’Europe des citoyens’ and so on. This slogan has 
impressed the minds of many, and even stickers with twelve 
stars on a blue background and the lofty catchphrase ‘Europe 
my country’ have been distributed. Is this just a way of catching 
the imagination of the person in the street or is there something 
substantial behind it? What is no less important: assuming the 
second alternative is true, is the concept of Community 
citizenship instrumental in strengthening human rights in 
Europe, or is it instead ‘irrelevant’ to human rights?
Four main points must be made. First, nationality is a 
bundle of rights and obligations based on a personal or 
territorial link established by each Member State of the 
Community, and on which each of the Member States of the 
Community is keen to retain the final say. Thus, the U.K. 
legislation alone says who qualifies as a British national, only 
France can establish who possesses French nationality, and so 
on.
The second and closely related point is that the 
Community has no authority to encroach upon this area: it 
cannot substitute itself for each of the Member States and 
decide who are its nationals. The third point is that Member 
States are very unlikely to relinquish their authority to decide on 
nationality. To put it differently, they and they alone will 
continue to decide who can be regarded as belonging to each of 
them thereby having the special legal status of national of the 
UK, France, Italy, and so on.
Fourthly, for the time being, Community citizenship only 
means that all nationals of each of the Twelve have a limited set 
of rights and duties in common: freedom of movement (that is 
the right to enter the territory of any other Member State), the 
right to reside in the territory of another Member State for the 
purpose of pursuing an economic activity there (as job-seeker 




























































































‘temporarily’, which however could mean ‘for an indefinite 
period’, the right to equality of treatment (in the area of work 
and employment, including enjoyment of trade union rights as 
well as regards elections to governing bodies of social security 
institutions). In addition, Community citizens enjoy a host of 
procedural rights vis-à-vis Community institutions (e.g. rights 
vis-à-vis Community organs, in particular the right of appeal to 
the European Court of Justice under Art. 173, para. 2).
If this is so, and if in particular Community citizenship 
only entails the aforementioned limited cluster of rights, one 
may well wonder whether this concept is conducive to an 
enhancement of human rights of nationals of the Twelve.
The answer is definitely in the affirmative. To expand the 
number of rights making up the concept of Community 
citizenship would no doubt bolster respect for human rights. 
For example, to expand the area of equality would put the 
national of a Member State residing in another Member State in 
a less disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the nationals of the State 
of residence. To grant foreign residents voting rights in local 
elections would enable them to have a say in the life of the 
community where they live. To allow foreign residents to take 
part in direct elections to the European Parliament held in a 
Member State other than their own would facilitate their 
participation in the political process leading to the choice of 
European representatives, and in addition would enable them to 
make a better choice (on the assumption that they may know 
better the candidates of the country where they reside 
permanently than those of their country of origin). To give 
foreign residents social security benefits at least as high as those 
accruing to nationals of the country of residence would ensure 
greater equality between workers and a uniform level of welfare.
It would therefore seem that the better way of moving 
forward would be to enlarge the present set of rights 
constituting the common possession of nationals of the Twelve. 
The goal of this gradual expansion -  to be achieved by means of 
Treaty amendments and, where possible, secondary legislation -  
would be to gradually build up a common ground for nationals 




























































































also in other fields, where they are no less in need of greater 
protection: rights to safety, environmental rights, educational 
and cultural rights, rights to information and the protection of 
privacy, rights in the area of genetics, medical ethics, and so on. 
It is thus apparent that a marked progress in all the fields to 
which specific reports in our research project have been 
devoted would of necessity entail an expansion of the concept 
of Community citizenship.
A collateral means of reinforcing the protection of those 
nationals might also reside in facilitating the acquisition by 
naturalization of the nationality of the State of residence. This 
would result in at least putting the nationals of a Member State 
on the exactly the same legal footing as the nationals of the 
particular State where they have taken up permanent residence. 
In view of the host of problems that this solution would raise or 
entail, a carefully drafted international agreement among the 
Twelve would be needed for this purpose.
E. Concern for respect for human rights in the outside
world
As was briefly stated above, the Community cannot, and does 
not, ignore what happens in the outside world. To concern 
oneself exclusively with what happens at home would be a 
selfish and outmoded attitude: human rights being universal, 
their respect does not stop at the border.
Although devoid of both a general mandate in the field of 
human rights, and of specific terms of reference concerning the 
impact of human rights on external relations, the Community 
has dealt with those rights with regard to the outside world too. 
Thus, the preamble and Art. 4 in the III Lomé Convention (1984) 
as well as the Joint Declaration relating to Art. 4, stress the 
importance of respect for human rights. The same holds true 
for the Cooperation Agreement with five Central American 
countries, of 1985, and the Agreement with Cyprus, of 1972 
(Art. 5). In addition, the Community has shown its interest in 
greater respect for human rights in the outside world by signing 




























































































To match this normative action, the Community has 
repeatedly taken action at the operational level. Various 
Community organs have taken one or more of the following 
actions: 1) exhortation to third States to respect human rights; 2) 
condemnations of States for their violations; 3) adoption of so- 
called sanctions (economic measures designed to penalize the 
target State) against countries found in breach of human rights 
(South Africa, USSR, Poland, Greece, Turkey as well as 
Argentina). In each case the action has taken a different 
emphasis, depending on the organ: by and large the European 
Parliament has been more alert to human rights, but also prone 
to a merely verbal condemnatory attitude; less vociferous have 
been the Commission and the Council, who have preferred a 
cautious, diplomatic attitude, along with the organs of the EPC 
(where in 1987 a ‘Working Group on Human Rights’ was 
established).
While the above course of action concerned the 
authorities of third States, a different line of action has also been 
adopted for Community firms operating in South Africa -  a 
Code of conduct was adopted in 1977 and revised in 1985.
Unfortunately, these policy lines have not yet yielded 
satisfactory results. The Parliament has failed to ensure that its 
pronouncements have the requisite impact on public opinion 
and the media. The Council and the Commission have shown a 
tendency to what might be regarded as excessive self-restraint, 
thus often missing an opportunity to exercise leverage on States 
that benefit from Community aid. As for the Code of conduct 
for Community enterprises, it has been given scant attention by 
its prospective addressees, mainly due to the fact that it lacks 
binding force.
To improve the present situation, a host of measures are 
called for. At the normative level, it would be important to 
insert provisions relating to human rights in as many 
international agreements signed by the Community as possible. 
If appropriately formulated, these clauses might offer the 
Community the right to call upon the contracting party to 
comply with human rights standards without its shielding 




























































































Furthermore, the Community ought to aim at transforming the 
Code of conduct mentioned above into a legally binding 
instrument.
V. Methods of Protection
A. Two different approaches: judicial review & access to
justice
The issue of methods of protection of fundamental human 
rights in the EC is at least twenty years old and has ushered forth 
an immense literature.
The unifying theme of most of this literature and indeed 
the theme that has dominated the discussion of human rights in 
the Community has been judicial protection of fundamental 
human rights. This is understandable: in the absence of a written 
Bill of Rights in the Treaties establishing the Community, and in 
the face of a need to fill this gap as a means of protecting the 
evolving constitutional rather than international character of the 
Community, the Court played both a prominent and courageous 
role in evolving its jurisprudence.
Judicial protection in the Community functions through 
the ability of the individual, utilizing any of the judicial routes 
available to him or her, to challenge a Community measure 
before the Court of Justice of the Community.
Principal points of discussion about the judicial method 
have been:
-  The normative content of protection, namely what rights will 
be given protection;
-  the question of standards, namely the level of protection to be 





























































































-  and finally the absence of a written list of these rights.
Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that the essential 
problems surrounding human rights can be solved provided the 
normative contents of the rights and the judicial protection:
-  are sufficiently wide (capturing all classical and new socio­
economic rights);
-  sufficiently high (protecting them at an adequate level);
-  and sufficiently clear (affording the individual, and the 
legislator, the ability to know what rights are protected).
The ‘Ideal Type’ of protection may thus be characterized as a 
normative-judicial model: substantive rights backed up by 
judicial review through the classical method of seizing the Court. 
The Joint Declaration of 1977, the Commission Memorandum of 
1979 on accession of the Community to the ECHR, and even the 
more recent Parliamentary Declaration of Fundamental Rights all 
fall within that paradigm: they identify defects in the model and 
suggest steps to improve it. This is the essence of what we 
would call, at least for convenience sake, the ‘Judicial Review 
Approach’.
The focus by commentators, and by the Community 
political organs, on Judicial Protection and on the great 
constitutional consequences for the Community legal order of 
this protection have, however, to some extent impoverished 
the debate about methods of protection of individual rights.
This ‘impoverishment’ has two dimensions: in the first 
place much, though not all, of the literature has tended to be 
celebratory rather than critical in its approach, neglecting some 
of the more difficult and perhaps even uncomfortable points in 




























































































Second, other dimensions of protection of fundamental 
human rights have perhaps been neglected. To critique the 
normative-judicial model is not to suggest its overthrow. It is 
certainly not to criticize the European Court of Justice which has 
played a crucial role in the evolution of individual protection in 
the Community.
The normative-judicial model must remain, and will 
remain, the cornerstone of protection of human rights in the 
Community. It is the near exclusivity of this model which must 
come under critical scrutiny. Even the most cursory reflection 
will reveal some of its weaknesses. Like similar all embracing 
models used in the economic analysis of law, it assumes a world 
which is transparent and rational, which often does not 
correspond to reality.
We shall first illustrate some weaknesses by way of 
example, then attempt a systematization of problems, and 
finally suggest a complementary model which should become, 
in our view, the focus of the procedural part of the Human 
Rights Action Plan.
Here, then, are some examples to highlight shortcomings 
of the normative-judicial model.
There may be a perfect substantive right (in terms of 
content) which protects the interests of an internal or external 
migrant worker; it may be judicially interpreted and enforced at 
a high and progressive level once adjudicated by the Court and it 
may even be set out clearly in some written document, and yet it 
is quite possible, and even probable, that the principal subjects 
of such a right, the migrant workers themselves -  for reasons of 
cultural, linguistic and socio-economic barriers -  will be totally 
ignorant of their ability to rely on such a right or rights when 
faced with a violation. They will simply never reach the Court.
There may be a perfect substantive right (in terms of 
content) in the area of consumer or environmental protection, 
but the impact of its violation on any single individual could be 




























































































standing or because of the cost of litigation, it will never reach 
the Court.
There may be a perfect substantive right (in terms of 
content) protecting the privacy interest of an individual against 
data collection or storage and giving him or her both access and 
a remedy in case of a breach. There may even be adequate 
judicial remedies in case of a violation. But the individual might 
not even know that his or her personal data have been entered 
into the data base.
There may be a perfectly construed right in the field of 
education or social security which, however, requires a financial 
outlay by public authorities if it is to receive full, or even partial, 
vindication. Comparative analysis alerts us to the danger of 
expecting/requiring courts to vindicate such rights which have 
an impact on the public purse. In some jurisdictions, courts 
simply refuse to do so. In others, they do with complex political 
and socio-economic consequences.
These four simple examples drive home the point that, in 
itself, the normative-judicial model, however sophisticated, does 
not provide sufficient guarantees for the protection of human 
rights to be truly effective.
The normative-judicial model must be complemented by 
an approach which insists on effective vindication over and 
above the normative content and judicial enforcement.
Again, for the sake of convenience only, we would like to 
refer to the complementary approach as the ‘Access-to-Justice’ 
approach -  denoting the range of procedural devices developed 
to make rights truly effective.
(1) Systematization of the Access-to-Justice approach
In the following we would like to set out the methodological 
criteria which should guide us in the consideration and 
incorporation of this complementary model to our discussion. 




























































































Differentiation, Information, Institutionalization, Means and 
Impact, Proceduralization.
(2) Differentiation
Clearly the key weakness of the normative-judicial model 
is that it treats, for most purposes, all rights in the same way in 
terms of their method of vindication -  as if all are susceptible of 
being vindicated in basically the same method and by the same 
route. The examples already demonstrate the danger of this 
approach. Clearly in the field, say, of data protection, an 
administrative provision such as a Commissioner for Data 
Protection and a requirement that public authorities report on 
any plan to open a new data base which would include personal 
information on individuals (such as we find in, for example, the 
British and the German systems) would be as important and 
maybe even more than a simple judicial remedy for a violation 
of privacy. Clearly in fields such as consumer protection or 
environmental protection, where interests and rights are diffuse 
and fragmented, consideration of different rules of standing 
maybe called for if substantive rights are not to remain on paper 
alone.
(3) Information
There are two dimensions to this parameter. The first concerns 
a simple information gap: we often simply do not know to what 
extent there is a problem of actual or potential violation of 
human rights in different sectors and the shape that these 
violations take. It is only with this knowledge that one could 
consider not only the normative content of the desired right but 
also the most effective means of vindication.
In the second place, each right, depending on its 
addressees -  whether private individuals or public authorities -  
calls for a different approach to disseminating the content of the 
right and the means for its vindication. Sometimes legislation is 
enough. Other times one would have to make a concerted effort 
to cross cultural, socio-economic and other barriers in order to 
inform potential victims of their rights. In practically all 




























































































uncollected by persons with entitlements -  i.e. persons whom 
society has deemed it right should enjoy these entitlements. The 
usual reason is simply ignorance.
(4) Impact and means
This heading touches primarily the so-called new social and 
economic rights. If the concept of human rights is not to be 
denigrated, it is necessary when discussing rights such as the 
‘right to work’, or rights to ‘decent housing’ to consider the 
financial resources necessary for their vindication, and the 
impact that consecration of such a right may have on the state.
The converse of this elaboration -  and another lesson that 
one learns from comparative analysis -  could be the 
requirement in fields such as environmental protection that new 
legislation and new public policies in diverse areas should be 
accompanied by impact studies on, say, the ecological balance 
of the environment. In the long run such a requirement, by 
rendering the policy formation more transparent, may be as 
beneficial as an individual right which is to be protected by the 
judges.
(5) Proceduralization
Under this heading one would have to investigate the different 
legal procedural devices which should accompany each right or 
cluster of rights. Should the right be available only against 
violations by public authorities (vertical vindication) or also 
against private bodies (horizontal vindication)? What time 
limitations, if any, should be imposed? What rules of standing 
should apply? What kind of legal aid should be available and 
from whom etc.
(6) Institutionalization
In the same vein, it is clear that different rights, or different 
clusters of rights, may require different institutional 
arrangements for their vindication. Here one may consider such 
centralized institutions as a Community Commissioner on 




























































































supervise the status, content, and vindication of human rights in 
the Community. But it is more likely that decentralized 
institutional arrangements such as advice bureaux may eventually 
be more effective.
B. Some possible options
(1) Options under the Judicial Review approach
We would first like to deal with options regarding the classical 
method of protection through ‘Judicial review’. The most 
persistent issue concerns the need for, and method of, having a 
catalogue of human rights as part of the corpus of Community 
law.
Two principal options, not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
present themselves here: a Community catalogue, and accession 
of the Community to the Council of Europe’s European 
Convention on Human Rights machinery. We shall deal with 
each separately.
(a) A catalogue of human rights for the Community.
(i) Does the Community need a catalogue?
The advantages of having a catalogue have been well rehearsed 
and do not require extensive recapitulation here. The principal 
advantages would arguably be: firstly, the enhanced legal 
certainty that such a catalogue would create both for the 
Community legislator and for individuals, and secondly, the 
symbolic value of having a Community ‘Bill of Rights’. These are 
not negligible advantages and should be considered carefully.
But this option is not without its difficulties. In the first 
place, the absence of a catalogue has not materially damaged 
protection of human rights in the Community. Very significant 
in this respect is the fact that whereas the German Constitutional 
Court in the 1970s seemed to insist that such a catalogue would 
be essential for a full accommodation of the Community legal 




























































































to accept an almost full accommodation without such a 
catalogue. The German Court was obviously impressed by the 
level of protection afforded by the Community even without 
such a catalogue.
A catalogue may add to legal certainty, but it would also 
contribute to at least some form of rigidity, in the sense that it 
may allow less progressive development by the Court. There is 
an alluring advantage in the present situation which allows the 
Court to follow developments in all Member States and on the 
international level without being tied down to a specific list of 
human rights.
We do not wish to pronounce categorically in favour or 
against the option of a Community Catalogue.
(ii) What kind of catalogue?
For the first time the Community now has the chance to 
produce such a catalogue in the form of the Parliamentary 
Declaration. We have already analyzed the main features of the 
Declaration. In particular, we noted its codifying philosophy and 
its prudent approach. In this respect, it may not be ideal since, 
in terms of its content, it looks backwards rather than forward. 
It is unlikely to please all actors. The main advantage of the 
Parliamentary Declaration is its very existence. Since it was 
drafted in a search for a common denominator, and was 
approved by a majority comprising all groups and nationalities it 
may be useful, if a decision is taken to elaborate a catalogue, to 
take the Declaration at least as a starting point.
This clearly would have one large advantage of avoiding the 
hugely complex and time consuming process of drafting. One 
could also recall, that the Declaration has an in-built device 
allowing the Court to continue looking to other sources in its 
judicial protection of human rights.
It is clear that one could draft, and perhaps even reach 
agreement on, a more ‘modern’ catalogue. But, undoubtedly, 




























































































result in failure which would be the worst possible result for 
those wishing to achieve something of symbolic importance.
(iii) The formal method of adopting a catalogue for the 
Community.
This might be the most delicate problem of all. We can envisage 
four main methods.
The first would be the adoption of a catalogue by way of 
Treaty Amendment. The main advantage would be the formal 
high normative status that such a catalogue would have in the 
hierarchy of norms of Community law. This would be the 
equivalent of a constitutional Bill of Rights par-excellence.
But there are dangers in this approach. First, such a 
method would be the most difficult in political terms and the 
corresponding risk of failure the greatest. Additionally, the risk 
of entrenching rigid rights with no room for development 
would present itself in the starkest terms. We would 
recommend caution before embarking on such a course of 
action course of action.
A second option would be the adoption of a catalogue by 
way of a regulation under Article 235. The advantages would also 
be in the formal legal status of such a catalogue as a source of law. 
The political process would not involve ratification by national 
parliaments and so would be easier. But even if construed as a 
framework regulation it would not become an entrenched 
source. A determined legislator could override it, and, 
paradoxically, in that case it would be more difficult for the 
Court to annul a measure which even though it violated human 
rights, nevertheless expressly derogated from the Community 
Catalogue of Rights contained in the regulation. If human rights 
were to be explicitly given the status of normal legislation, it 
would in effect demote their current ‘higher law’ character. We 
do not think that the advantages of this method outweigh the 
disadvantages.
Our preference -  if a catalogue is in fact deemed desirable 




























































































law status which the Court of Justice has given to human rights, 
but which would still have the advantages of a written list.
Two other options arise in this context.
The first would be to elaborate a catalogue, or make use of 
the Parliamentary Declaration, modified or intact, and take the 
1977 Joint Declaration one step further, namely a Common 
Declaration which would associate the Community institutions 
with the elaborated catalogue. The catalogue in this formula 
would not formally attain the status of the Treaty of Rome but 
would become the first and principal source for the Court in its 
judicial protection.
The second option, already suggested once before, would 
be to make a Treaty amendment committing the Community 
legal order to the protection of fundamental human rights, but 
leaving the elaboration in the form of a solemn Declaration. The 
language of such an amendment could be similar to that used in 
the Parliamentary Declaration which is based on the principles 
enunciated by the European Court of Justice.
Thus the new Treaty Article could read:
‘Measures incompatible with fundamental rights are 
inadmissible in the field of application of Community Law’.
This type of amendment would be less delicate from the 
political point of view since Member States would be codifying 
the Community constitutional situation as it already exists.
(b) Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Before canvassing the advantages and disadvantages of accession 
we have to ask: advantages for who?
Reading the Commission’s 1979 memorandum on this 
question, we are left in no doubt that accession would have at 
least four advantages for the Community: first, it would project 
an image of a democratic caring Community; second, it would 




























































































serve as precedent for accession to various international 
organizations; third, it would go some way to ensuring that 
human rights in the context of Community law are interpreted 
and enforced in a consistent way; and fourth, in the event of a 
challenge to Community legislation, it would allow the 
Community to defend itself and its objectives before the 
Strasbourg Commission.
However, from the perspective of a potential victim, a 
Community citizen, looking for Community protection in the 
1990’s, these factors are of little interest. Accession to the 
European Convention would not solve some of the issues 
outlined above. Issues such as: to what extent can non-nationals 
be protected by Community law? how can cultural pluralism be 
protected in the era of transnational satellite television? and how 
can the social rights of Community workers be protected 
through a Community-wide implementation of the social 
dialogue? Furthermore, areas where the Community stands to 
make most progress: environmental and consumer policy, 
social rights and political rights in a People’s Europe, and the 
promotion of human rights in third countries, would be little 
enhanced. In fact one has to admit that moves towards accession 
may sap energy and enthusiasm for the whole question of the 
protection of human rights in the Community legal order.
At present there is nothing to stop anyone complaining to 
the Strasbourg Commission of Human Rights about the national 
implementation of a Community provision. The only extra 
remedy which accession would bring for Community citizens 
would be the chance to complain in Strasbourg about the acts 
and legislation of Community organs. Such complaints can 
usually be brought before the European Court of Justice 
although it has not yet really developed its appreciation of the 
Convention.
The actual legal status of the Convention in this context is 
not clear, and much has been written about the legal basis for 
the application of the Convention by the Court. Indeed, the 
Commission and some of the Court’s Advocates General regard 
the substantive provisions of the Convention as binding on the 




























































































political institutions did not go so far. For some, the theory of 
substitution (which explains Community competences in the 
context of the GATT) provides a legal basis. It is difficult to 
accept this reasoning given the very late ratification of the 
Convention by France, and the Member States’ different 
reservations and adhesions to the Protocols. Another basis 
could be the duty enshrined in Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome 
which states that prior international rights of Member States 
should remain unaffected.
The issue today is largely moot. The Court has indicated its 
intention to look to the Convention whenever it addresses an 
issue of human rights. And although the Court dropped the 
word ‘guidelines’ when referring to the Convention in the 
Panasonic case (Cases 136 & 137/79 [1980] ECR 2033) and 
assimilated the Convention to the Constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, not much turns on this semanticism. In 
searching for criteria it was only natural that the Court would 
turn to the one text on which all Member States were agreed.
Nevertheless accession to the ECHR has a number of 
major advantages. As the Commission points out in the 
memorandum, ‘however satisfactory and worthy of approval 
the method developed by the Court may be, it cannot rectify at 
least one of the shortcomings affecting the legal order of the 
Communities through the lack of a written catalogue of 
fundamental rights: the impossibility of knowing in advance 
which are the liberties which may not be infringed by the 
Community under any circumstances. The European Citizen has 
a legitimate interest in having his rights vis-à-vis the Community 
laid down in advance. He must be able to assess the prospects 
of any possible legal dispute from the outset and therefore have 
at his disposal clearly defined criteria.’ (para. 5). Accession 
would give citizens, not only a clearly defined list, but the 
benefit of a large amount of case law as developed by the 
Strasbourg organs.
In addition, the invisible effects of accession should not be 
underestimated. Accession could mean that national judges 
would have to consider the Convention (and its case law) when 




























































































Commission states that:‘Additional obligations would arise only 
with regard to the freedom of action of the Community 
institutions and their legislative and administrative functions’ 
(para. 41), it is quite likely that accession would mean the 
Convention exerting a creeping influence on Community law 
generally.
If, under the present situation, the Strasbourg organs find 
the Member States liable under the ECHR for the 
implementation of a binding Community norm, this would be 
unsatisfactory in that the real defendant, the Community, would 
not have been the respondent. Likewise, though of lesser 
importance is the fact that a Member State might in theory have 
to defend itself before the Commission or Court of Human 
Rights for actions incumbent upon it by virtue of Community 
membership.
For some commentators, the main advantage of accession 
is that it would fill these procedural gaps in the protection 
offered by the Strasbourg system. We do not subscribe to this 
view. We do not think that the mere chance of a case against the 
Community not being properly heard justifies accession, nor do 
we believe that this was the real reason behind the 
Commission’s proposal in the 1979 Memorandum.
In our view, the most important factor behind the 
Commission initiative in 1979 was the international personality 
and status implications that would have accrued to the 
Community as a result of accession. Accession would have 
enhanced the ‘State’ like features of the Community in a period 
in which European integration seemed to be stagnating. If we 
are right in this speculation, this rationale for accession is no 
longer applicable. The Community, now on an upsurge, does 
not need that kind of boost.
Nowadays, it is less a question of how much the 
Community needs the ECHR, and more a question of whether 
the ECHR needs the Community. There is a danger that the focal 





























































































Our conclusion, therefore, is that from a practical point of 
view, accession promises to be technically and politically 
difficult and would result in few tangible results at the level of 
protection of individual rights in the Community.
But there are other reasons which lend support to the 
Commission proposal. The main advantage which would accrue 
to the Community would be the symbolism inherent in 
subjecting the Community, its agents and bodies, and even the 
European Court itself, to a measure of scrutiny by an outside 
body.
To those who object that the European Court of Human 
Rights is not equipped to review decisions of the European 
Court of Justice or understand the Community context, we 
would point out that the Court of Human Rights does after all 
review the constitutional decisions of national constitutional 
courts which are submerged in their own national context in the 
same way that the European Court understands the Community 
context.
One of the basic ideas of transnational adjudication of 
human rights is that it is exercised by a tribunal which is at least 
one stage removed from the system which it is judging. In 
theory, review of decisions of the European Court of Justice by a 
higher tribunal is feasible. In practice, it is doubtful if the 
European Court of Human Rights would find much to criticize in 
the approach of the European Court of Justice, but the 
possibility of such an appeal would be of enormous symbolic 
importance.
(2) Options under the access to justice approach
In this last section, we will present some of the options 
suggested for enhancing the protection of human rights in the 
sense described above. As with our earlier proposals, what 
follows is not a blueprint but is instead an inventory of the types 
of issues -  related to methods of protection -  which may be 






























































































It is not for us to propose specific institutions since it is beyond 
our ability to assess questions such as personnel, cost and the 
like.
Instead, we propose some approaches to thinking about 
institutional questions in the context of protection of human 
rights. We put forward what at first might seem a contradictory 
agenda: the need, on the one hand, for a centralized approach 
and, on the other hand, the need for a differentiated sectorial 
institutional approach. As will become clear, we believe that the 
contradiction is only apparent.
(i) Central coordination for Community human rights and a 
programmatic white paper.
It is appropriate that ultimate responsibility for Human Rights in 
the Community will be part of the ‘portfolio’ of the President of 
the Commission (as is the case today) who, of course, is 
answerable to the European Parliament. But one may consider, 
if an Action Plan is adopted, whether there is no place for 
appointment (at least for the duration of an Action Plan) of a 
unit or Task Force, largely autonomous, and which is headed by 
a high ranking official who is directly attached to the President. 
This office would be charged with both elaborating and then 
executing a Commission policy and/or action plan in this field. 
The exact remit of such an office would of course depend on the 
ambitiousness of any plan adopted. To suggest the creation of a 
new institutional structure might seem to fall into the old trap of 
substituting procedure for substance. And, after all, the 
realization of an approfondissement of human rights in 
concrete terms will fall on the shoulders of the various 
Directorate Generals dealing with the different substantive issues 
(environment, consumer protection, women’s rights, etc.) as 





























































































(ii) What would be the real role of a Human Rights Task Force?
The inspiration for this model comes from the Community 
itself: the hugely successful 1992 White Paper on the Internal 
Market. The primary initial charge of the Human Rights Task 
Force would be the elaboration of a programmatic White Paper 
setting out concrete goals -  institutional and normative -  in the 
field of human rights. We would hope that the present Report 
could help to set the agenda for such an activity. As in the case 
of the White Paper on the completion of the Internal Market, 
realization would demand an effort (far less taxing, we believe) 
from all services, but the existence of a coherent concept, a 
coherent programmatic plan, and a tangible time-table would 
be a key to success, and would remedy the deficiencies of the 
current fragmented efforts alluded to above.
(iii) Sectoral institutions
In the following, we are borrowing, selectively, from national 
experience in this field. Since the late 1950s, we have witnessed 
the enactment of a variety of human right provisions in different 
national contexts. One feature of these moves was the realization 
that it was not sufficient, in a large, diverse and complex society 
to put on the statute book an ever increasing number of rights 
and legal remedies, but that it was imperative to ensure an 
institutional back up which is charged with ensuring real 
effectiveness for the rights guaranteed. For example, in Great 
Britain, rights in the field of sex discrimination were backed up 
by the creation of the Equal Opportunity Commission. Labour 
law rights were backed up with a variety of arbitration and 
conciliation services together with health and safety 
inspectorates. More specific examples are given in the Report 
on ‘Methods of Protection.’
It is possible to divide the institutional functions into the 
following tasks for ensuring:
A constant flow of accurate information about the realization of 
the normative programmes (information function).
A continuous effort of self-reflective re-evaluation of the impact 




























































































with a view to amendment and improvement (active feedback 
and self correction function).
A specific active agency which would seek the legal 
enforcement of human rights policies, rather than simply 
leaving the system to rely on the initiative of victims of 
violations. This was the result of the realization that often the 
victims of human right violations were the least capable of 
vindicating their rights through the traditional legal system.
It is of course true that in some areas in the Community, 
such as sex discrimination, different Commission services 
covering similar tasks exist; the question is whether combating 
sex discrimination should be generally institutionalized and 
whether formalization of this function would not enhance the 
seriousness, prestige and ultimately the effectiveness of the 
exercise.
In particular, we would like to make one principled 
observation.
The Commission and its legal service have played a capital 
role in ensuring compliance by Member States with Community 
law -  through, for example, the Article 169 procedure. There 
have, over the years, been hundreds of initiations of Article 169 
procedures. Many were resolved at the stage of the initial 
seizing, some at the stage of the reasoned opinion, and in a great 
deal of cases the matter was brought before the Court which has 
vindicated the position of the Commission in the overwhelming 
majority of cases.
By comparison, the Commission has initiated remarkably 
few actions against other Community institutions under Article 
173 and remarkably few actions have been initiated against the 
Commission and Council by individuals under Article 173- To be 
sure, this is partly because of the restricted standing afforded to 
individuals; and it is also true that there has been an increase in 
the number of 177b actions by individuals implicating 
Community measures. But as we shall explain below, the 
increase in the number of 177b actions can only be considered 





























































































The main problem, in our view, is that, as presently 
constituted, the Commission suffers from a serious conflict of 
interests. The very same Commission and legal service charged 
with the guardianship of the Treaty also has a major role in the 
legislative process and is the Community executive and 
administrative branch. Thus, whereas the services and the 
Commission can act, and do often act, with vigour when it 
comes to challenging the Member States, it is understandable 
that the same vigour cannot, and is not, applied when it comes 
to self-scrutiny and self-criticism. How could it be otherwise? It 
is the ancient dilemma of “who will watch the watchmen?’
The fact that the Court, for reasons which cannot be 
analyzed here, has denied Parliament standing to sue other 
Community institutions under Article 173 merely aggravates this 
problem.
Two policy issues thus present themselves in this context.
The first is whether the Community should create a 
structure which would have greater independence from the ‘in 
house’ Commission service. If the reply is positive, the second 
question concerns the relationship such a unit would have to the 
overall structure of the Commission.
It is clear that such a new structure could remain within the 
Commission organigram answerable to the President. But at the 
same time, by an act of ‘self-limitation’ it should be guaranteed a 
high degree of independence so that its activities, investigations, 
negotiations and litigational decisions are not subjected to the 
conflict of interest described above. It is premature to speculate 
as to exactly what form such a unit would have.
Just as we argued for consideration of the creation of 
central coordination in the form of a Human Rights Task Force, 
we would also suggest that more thought be given to specialized 
human rights institutional responsibilities within the 
Commission structures. There is no contradiction between the 




























































































monitoring and promotion of human rights in the context of a 
specific service which is ‘human rights-sensitive.’
Our model here is a Community model. In the fields of 
anti-dumping, competition and the like the Community already 
has special monitoring and investigation services which, of 
course, coordinate their activities with other relevant services. 
Our argument is that especially where the Community has 
moved beyond the classical overarching rights of non­
discrimination into a variety of ‘positive’ areas in sectors such as 
the labour market, the environment and the like, such 
institutional responsibility could be useful.
We do not think that the Commission is extraneous to 
these considerations in some fields, nor that it is insensitive to 
enforcement. But the feeling is that these efforts are somewhat 
ad hoc, differ radically from one service to another, and also 
suffer from problems of conflict of interest.
As part of an Action Plan, one could envisage that each 
Commission Service -  whose activities touch on human rights -  
would have to engage in an exercise of self-reflection and 
propose internal reorganization -  where necessary and 
appropriate -  which responded to the need for active 
supervision and enforcement of Human Rights.
Specific Proposals in different sectors may be found in 
each of the substantive Reports.
(iv) Commission or Community Ombudsman. (See Reports on 
administrative law)
The institution of the Ombudsman is well known, has been tried 
in a variety of systems in different areas and hardly needs 
description. Views differ as to its success. The Classical function 
of an Ombudsman will be covered by the variety of institutional 
proposals mentioned above.
It is, nonetheless, worthwhile in our view to consider the 
office of the Ombudsman for one primary reason: the symbolic 




























































































societies. It is a reassuring institution and one which would have 
public appeal. It would be an ideal address for any citizen or 
resident who would not, and could not, find his or her way in 
the ever increasing institutional complexity of the Community. 
Under a minimalist approach, the Ombudsman would probably 
act in most cases as a sorting office for complaints -  directing 
them to the relevant existing and new institutions. But even 
under this minimalist approach he or she would serve two 
hugely important functions: providing a readily accessible 
address, and making sure that complaints received treatment, 
were followed up, and that the complainer received an adequate 
and full answer.
We essentially take a skeptical view as to the creation of an 
Ombudsman especially since this function has been assumed by 
the Committee of Petitions of the European Parliament. If there 
is room for improvement, and we think there is, it lies in finding 
ways to give much higher visibility to the Committee of 
Petitions so that it becomes a widely known institution in 
Europe. This is clearly not the case today.
(v) Conclusions concerning institutional options.
All these proposals are no more than stimulants for further 
discussion of how to improve Community mechanisms. They 
do have, however, one unifying feature. They involve the 
Community in taking an active and reflexive rather than reactive 
approach to human rights.
Active in the sense of somewhat aggressively seeking to 
give effect to norms. Reflexive in the sense of understanding that 
these norms must be applied vigorously also to the very 
institutions which enact them.
(b) Procedural proposals
In discussing the institutional proposals we put the emphasis on 
an active role for the Community, and principally the 
Commission, in itself enforcing Community human rights. We 
will turn now to the other dimension of rights vindication -  by 




























































































actions by individuals either directly before the Court of Justice, 
or through the indirect Article 177 procedure. It is the latter 
which is the cornerstone of judicial protection in the 
Community and the lion’s share of our proposals will address 
problems with that procedure together with proposals for 
making it more effective in guaranteeing the protection of 
human rights. It should be mentioned in this context that it is 
not always possible to differentiate between improvements in 
judicial protection generally, and human rights in particular.
(0 The field of application of Community law -  the extent of 
human rights protection.
We will deal with this issue briefly. It is dealt with extensively in 
the Report on ‘Methods of Protection’. For the reasons given in 
that Report we endorse the view taken by the Legal Service of 
the Commission that when Member States act in derogation 
from a Community norm, such activity should be reviewed by 
the Court for violation of human rights.
(ii) Reverse discrimination
The doctrine of reverse discrimination whereby no protection 
is afforded an individual in a purely national context is sound in 
many circumstances. However, to the extent that the 
Community right claimed by the individual, even in a purely 
national context, is also a fundamental right recognized by the 
Court, it is submitted that reverse discrimination becomes 
problematic in that it creates an unacceptable discrimination 
between Community nationals depending on the national 
context in which the violation takes place. It is suggested, 
therefore, that the Court may wish to review the doctrine with a 
view to limiting it in this context.
(iii) Direct effect of directives
At present, the direct effect of directives does not extend to 
horizontal situations where individuals seek to vindicate a right 
provided by a directive against another private body (in cases of 
non-incorporation or erroneous incorporation by national 




























































































derivative from the rationale for direct effect of directives 
developed in the case-law of the Court.
However, in some cases, such as the Sex Discrimination 
directives, the Community measures encapsulate fundamental 
human rights. The result is the uncomfortable situation where, 
for example, two school teachers subjected to the same kind of 
sex discrimination, but one working in a state school and 
another working in a private school will have different remedies. 
There is, it is submitted, a strong case for reviewing whether in 
cases of fundamental human rights the direct effect of directives 
should extend to both vertical and horizontal situations, such 
effect could be explicitly stated in order to avoid any 
uncertainty.
(iv) The class action
Many of the new rights -  such as consumer and environmental 
rights constitute what are called diffuse or fragmented rights; 
violation of these right may affect many individuals in a minor 
way so that individual litigation can not be justified, or national 
rules of locus standi (under which individuals seeking to invoke 
Article 177(b) must operate) may deny standing. Nonetheless, 
the cumulative violation of the right might have quite serious 
consequences. In theory, this type of violation could be taken 
up by the Commission itself, but as we saw when the 
Community itself is the object of attack, it is artificial to rely on 
the Commission to act impartially as guarantor of the right.
The class action is one of the remedies developed in other 
systems to vindicate diffuse and fragmented interests. The Court 
has already recognized the interest in intervention in actions 
instigated by individuals by representatives of diffuse and 
fragmented interests such as Consumer groups and the like. The 
modalities of such new standing would need special study which 
goes beyond the scope of this Report. To be a general remedy, 
it would probably need Treaty amendment, unless the Court 
were willing to engage in some redefinition of direct and 




























































































But it is also conceivable that as part of new legislative acts 
in fields characterized by diffuse and fragmented interests, the 
measure itself will specify special remedies or forms of action 
tailored to the field in question.
We should point out that even such measures would not 
wholly solve the problem. National courts remain the principal 
locus for vindication of Community rights and it is national rules 
of procedure that govern the standing of individuals and groups 
who want to bring an action even in the field of Community law. 
The only requirements of Community law are that the new 
procedures should not be more onerous for Community rights 
nor that they eliminate an action altogether.
It could only be through a difficult, though desirable, 
process of harmonization that one could deal with the problem 
raised by the disparity of standing in the different Member 
States.
(v) Judicial delays: ‘jumping the queue’
At present the normal waiting time for an Article 177 action 
before the Court is well over one year and may be as long as two 
years. This is worrisome as regards all cases and it does not seem 
likely that the creation of the First Instance Court will do much 
to relieve the waiting. One may consider whether cases which 
prima-facie involve immediate deprivations of individual 
fundamental rights should be given priority in the determination 
of the timetable of the Court.
(vi) Non-references to the European Court
This is one of the enigmas and unexplored areas of Community 
law: the extent to which courts in the Member States should and 
yet do not make references to the ECJ under the Article 177 
procedure. The implications can also touch on fundamental 
human rights. In any radical revision of procedures, this 
problem might finally have to be addressed. It seems to us that 
where a Community measure is involved, the creation of some 




























































































have less grave implications for cooperation between ECJ and 
national courts than where the dispute is over national measures.
(vii) ‘Grants in Aid’ for test cases
It is a known feature of the Community that different types of 
cases come from different Member States. Thus, for example, 
most sex discrimination cases have come from Britain. Part of 
the reason is that in Britain the Equal Opportunities Commission 
offers financial and professional assistance in many test cases. In 
general, the situation in Member States as regards legal aid and 
other support for these types of action is quite uneven. And yet 
one is dealing with rights granted by the Community.
The proposal is that the Commission examine on a ‘field 
by field’ basis the possibility of giving Community funding and 
Community based support to meritorious actions. This will 
serve the double purpose of rendering the vindication of rights 
more effective, and also more equal, in the different Member 
States.
(viii) Information
The last proposal is also the most abstract and yet, probably, 
the most important. In our view, the key to the effective 
vindication of rights is information at all levels. At the level of 
the administrators who draft and execute policies and at the 
level of Community citizens. There is no one proposal that may 
operate here. Each sector deserves its own unique information 
effort. There will be one effective effort for rights directed at 
migrant workers and another for those directed at economic 
operators in the field of data protection.
In this regard, our proposal is both normative and 
procedural. One will recall that at a certain point in the evolution 
of the Community, in the interests of effective vindication of 
Community law, provisions were included in all directives which 
required Member States to report back on the incorporation of 




























































































It is suggested that in relation to all legislation coming out 
of the services of the Commission there will be a standard 
requirement that the legislation include provisions, or 
explanations, on how, (in relation to the specificity of the 
measure) information about the rights included therein be 
ensured. Clearly, publication in the Official Journal will usually 
not be adequate. Likewise, each piece of legislation should, as a 
matter of standard practice, include provisions whereby the 
service which proposed the measure will explain, or provide 
through legislation, the institutional arrangements for 
implementing the monitoring, enforcement, and impact of the 
provisions. Naturally, this will have financial implications. But 
then justice has never been cheap.
Following the functional division of tasks in the 
Community we have addressed most of these procedural 
proposals for reflection by the Commission and its services. 
This is not intended to exclude or diminish the many activities of 
the European Parliament in this field. The essence of all 
proposals was the deepening of existing institutional and 
procedural structures to render vindication of rights more 
effective.
There is one specific role that Parliament can play in this 
field. Parliament could, in the context of the scrutiny of 
Community legislation, institutionalize a specific request 
concerning monitoring, information, implementation and 
enforcement. At present, the Legal Affairs Committee 
scrutinizes the general Commission Report on Implementation 
of Community law and makes many proposals for rendering 
Community law more effective. But this is a centralized effort. 
What we are suggesting here is the adoption of a practice that 
any relevant Commission proposal which does not include 
adequate provisions or explanations for effective dissemination, 
and adequate institutional arrangements for effective 
implementation and enforcement in the field of human rights 
be automatically amended or rejected by Parliament.
We favour a decentralized approach within the European 
Parliament because, as explained above, in relation to each 




























































































something that only the relevant Committees of the European 
Parliament would be in a position to evaluate and amend.
VI. Final Remarks
The debate about human rights and the Community has up till 
now focussed on whether the Community can, or should, move 
into this sphere, or whether this is a question which merely 
concerns Member States.
Member State action outside the scope of Community law 
which seriously threatens human rights can usually be checked 
by the existing national and international apparatus. However, 
where action is really needed is in the field of Community law. In 
this area, the drive towards ‘1992’ and the implications which go 
beyond ‘1992’ mean that people in the Community will be 
subjected to new controls, new technology, new transnational 
actors, new forms of work, and continuing racial and sexual 
discrimination. Without new rights and remedies, some 
individuals and groups could find the negative effects of 
integration outweighing the positive opportunities which it 
claims to offer.
If Community institutions and legislation do not take full 
account of the human rights implications of the Community 
dynamic they will quickly alienate the men and women who 
make up Europe. However, there is no one simple step which 
would resolve all the human rights problems in the field of 
Community law. Human rights protection is a question of 
constant vigilance. It is for the Community to respond now to 
the anxiety and fears expressed by its citizens. The drawing up 
of a Human Rights Action Plan (together with organizational 
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